

BOOKS
FOR WAR TIME

EUROPE IN THE SPRING

by Clare Boothe

ISOLATED AMERICA

by Raymond Leslie Buell

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR AMERICA

by Charles A. Beard

OUR MILITARY CHAOS

by Oswald Garrison Villard

THE NEW WORLD ORDER

by H. G. Wells

THE NAZI DICTATORSHIP

EUROPE ON THE EVE
NIGHT OVER EUROPE

by Frederick L. Schuman

These are Borzoi Books, published by

ALFRED • A • KNOPF

HOW TO WIN THE WAR

HOW TO WIN THE WAR

B Y
AN ENGLISHMAN



NEW YORK: ALFRED · A · KNOPF


1 9 4 1

COPYRIGHT 1941 by ALFRED A. KNOFF, INC.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote brief passages in a review to be printed in a magazine or newspaper.

Manufactured in the United States of America

FIRST AMERICAN EDITION



CONTENTS

I • WHY THIS BOOK WAS WRITTEN	3
<i>Hitler's Total War</i>	5
<i>What Hitler Learned from the Russians</i>	14
<i>Methods of Total War</i>	17
<i>Hitler's New European Order</i>	28
<i>Two Rival Strategies</i>	33
II • THE FOREIGN OFFICE MACHINE	43
<i>Gentlemen versus Players</i>	47
<i>The Way of Failure</i>	53
<i>The Case of Italy</i>	58
<i>The Spanish War</i>	61
<i>Mr. Chamberlain Takes a Hand</i>	64
<i>What Must be Done</i>	68
III • PROPAGANDA	75
<i>Goebbels and Hitler</i>	75
<i>Lessons from Mein Kampf</i>	80
<i>Ministry of Information and B.B.C.</i>	84
<i>Home Morale</i>	92
<i>Propaganda Abroad</i>	96
<i>Conclusions</i>	103

CONTENTS

IV • THE HOME OFFICE AND THE FIFTH COLUMN	106
<i>What Is the Fifth Column?</i>	106
<i>The Home Office and the Refugees</i>	117
<i>How to Collaborate with the Exiles</i>	129
V • CONCLUSIONS	133

HOW TO WIN THE WAR



CHAPTER I

WHY THIS BOOK WAS WRITTEN

How can Britain win this war? The Minister of Information would probably send for his Silent Column if he heard me ask this question. Victory, he seems to believe, will be won by silent, unquestioning faith in the Government of which he is a member. I do not share this view, nor, I believe, do many serving soldiers. Faith may move mountains, but a blind faith in the Government will not remove Hitler. The most loyal patriots today are not the ostriches who do not *dare* to think, but those people who are prepared to face the facts before they make up their minds. It is to such people that this book is addressed.

How can Britain win this war? Hitler has conquered Europe, and though the British are confident that they can repel invasion, that by itself will not bring them victory. They have got to move from the defensive to

the offensive. *What form will that offensive take?* Without asking for technical details the citizen of a democracy has a right to a general answer to this question. So far he has not received one.

How can the British win this war? Hitler has not only conquered the soil of Europe; in a gigantic moral offensive he has cast down the ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity which dominated Europe and the world for a hundred and fifty years and is constructing a new European order. Against this moral offensive, tanks and bombers alone will not avail. When the British troops cross the Channel and make their bridgeheads in France, Belgium, and Holland, what message of hope will they bring? What new European order do they offer as the alternative to Hitler's Third Reich? To this question the free people of Britain, as well as the oppressed peoples of Europe, can reasonably demand an answer. Nothing but the vaguest of generalities has passed the lips even of a Labour Minister.

Without a clear answer to these questions, Britain cannot win this war. Not only the Government and Whitehall, but the people—soldiers, sailors, airmen, and civilians—must know the cause for which they are fighting and the general strategy of battle.

This book is written both to ask these questions and to look for their answers. The author is convinced of three things: (1) that Hitler can be defeated if the British go about it the right way, (2) that he cannot be defeated unless they go about it the right way, and (3) that at present they are not going about it the right way. When he reached these conclusions, he realized

that he would be failing in his duty if he joined the Silent Column. Equally you will be failing if, having read this book and agreed with its conclusions, you, too, remain silent.

Hitler's Total War

At the beginning of this war, many British leaders said: "We must start where we left off in 1918." If, they argued, they avoided the mistakes of 1914, 1915, 1916, and 1917, and tried to reconstruct the war organization of the year of victory, they were bound, in due course, to win.

But between November 11, 1918 and September 3, 1939 lay twenty-one years of fast-moving history. In every sphere of life gigantic changes had occurred; almost the only things which remained unchanged were the politicians and civil servants who controlled the destinies of France and Britain. These gentlemen wanted to begin where they left off last time.

Already in France we have seen the result of this policy. A great nation collapsed and a great army failed to fight. The lesson of France is clear: whatever the men who won the last war may wish, disaster will be repeated by beginning where they left off in 1918. They have got to begin where Hitler has brought them in 1940.

This, of course, will be a confounded nuisance to certain important people who do not like to be disturbed—especially by foreigners like Germans and Russians. These important people are convinced that they have nothing to learn from foreigners; they know best,

and, anyway, they always muddle through. Well, they have been muddling through ever since, in 1918, the armies of Britain and France, despite their generals, beat the Germans and made the world safe for democracy. They have been muddling through while Hitler, who does not believe in muddle, has methodically and efficiently conquered Europe and utterly destroyed any good which they achieved by their victory. Whatever the important people may think, many are beginning to believe that clear thought may be preferable to muddle.

In order to think out clearly and coolly the best way of defeating Hitler, a good many preconceptions have got to be got rid of. And the first of them is that they can choose what sort of war they are going to fight. Until they permitted Hitler to dominate Europe, they could have done this because they were the top dog. Now they can do so no longer. So far this has been Hitler's war, and he has decided not to fight it according to the 1918 rules. He has evolved an entirely new technique of war, of which Foch and Haig, and even Lloyd George, had no inkling twenty-one years ago. By using this technique, he has won a series of outstanding victories: but one of the main reasons why he has won is that his opponents tried to fight him with the technique of 1918.

The first innovation Hitler made was to start making war years before war was declared. Indeed, he won several campaigns while the British were doing their best to "appease" him. Hitler's war against Europe started in 1933 when he stood and watched his Storm

Troopers marching in torchlight procession into Berlin. We can go even further back and say that it started on that evening in 1920 when a certain Corporal Adolf Hitler became the seventh member of the National Socialist Party in the back room of a small Munich beer house. The proverb says that it takes two to make a quarrel; but it takes only one to make a war. Ever since Hitler joined the Nazi Party he has been at war against the Europe which emerged from the Allied victories of 1918. The first stage of that war, from 1920 to 1933, was the conquest of Germany by Hitler and the Nazi Party. The second stage was the organization of Germany as the greatest war machine which the world has ever known. The third stage was the use by Hitler of this war machine in order to expunge the map of Europe and to redraw it according to his own design. The second and third stages overlap by a few years, since long before the war machine was ready, Hitler was able, by his own bravado and the complicity of his opponents, to begin his career of conquest. That started in March 1936, when his troops entered the Rhineland and the British refused to support the French when they wanted to march against him.

The declaration of war in September 1939 was merely an incident in a war which had been going on for nineteen years. It meant that the Governments of France and Britain at long last admitted to themselves that Hitler was making war upon them, and determined—somewhat half-heartedly—to employ military force against him.

It may be objected that in suggesting that Hitler's

war started in 1920 I am distorting the meaning of the word "war." But war means the use of organized violence to achieve an objective. In this sense Hitler has been at war ever since, with the assistance of Röhm and Göring he formed the Storm Troops and thus provided himself with a private army. Between 1920 and 1939 there may not have been a war according to our definition of that word; but war is not like football: it does not stop when someone is caught breaking the rules. A player cannot be ordered off the field. On the contrary, if he breaks them cleverly and all the other players content themselves with protesting that he is just not playing the game, he may score a record number of goals. That is what Hitler did between 1933 and 1939.

Whether we like it or not, we have got to scrap our definition of war and grasp Hitler's. Otherwise we shall not be able to resist him at all. This means that before we decide our own strategy we must understand his. That is not difficult as Hitler has explained his methods quite clearly in *Mein Kampf*; and if that is not enough we can study them in the books of Dr. Rauschning, who was once an intimate associate of his.

Hitler's objective is the supremacy of the German race. People have been inclined to laugh at Racialism and to believe that because it is scientific nonsense it has no political significance. But to think this is to commit a fatal mistake. Once Hitler had made his objective the supremacy of the German race, his war became not a battle of nation state against nation state but a revolutionary struggle to destroy nation states

altogether and to create a new European order. He did not merely defeat Austria and Czechoslovakia, Poland, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Norway, and France and then come to terms with their Governments: he destroyed them and he is now trying to create in their place a new order, of political, of social order, and of culture.

If the objectives of those who wage war are different, then their strategy will be different. In the war of 1914 both sides were trying to achieve a military victory; but the victors, the Allies, when it had been won, that military victory would come to mean nothing other than that the Allies' rights be changed, reparations might be paid, but neither side, until very near the end of the war, showed any interest in the internal politics of the other or any desire to disintegrate its social order.

We can understand the novel character of Hitler's war even more clearly by comparing Hitler with Bismarck. Some people have been blind enough to suggest that National Socialism is just Pan-Germanism for Bismarck's "blood and iron" dished up with slightly different trimmings. But Bismarck was a conservative and exceedingly cautious nineteenth-century politician. Both in his home and in his foreign policy his aim was to create a German nation state under Prussian control. He defeated Austria-Hungary and France, but the last thing he wanted was to revolutionize the established order in those countries or to annihilate the Habsburg Empire and the French nation. He created a great German army, but he used it to revolutionize German life

but to defend the *status quo*. Once he had established Germany as a great power, his foreign policy became ultra-cautious since his wish was that the German state should exist and prosper alongside other states. He may have wanted to dominate Europe, but he would have imprisoned as a subversive anarchist anyone who suggested destroying it and rebuilding it on National Socialist lines.

What distinguishes Hitler from Bismarck is not only his concept of the supremacy of the German race but his technique of *total warfare*. This phrase has been misused to mean merely the mobilization of man-power and industry for war. But in Hitler's total warfare such mobilization is merely one feature. What Hitler means by "total war" is firstly *a war designed to disintegrate the other side entirely, not merely to inflict on it a military defeat*. In the second place he means a *permanent* war whether the other side, or rather, the rest of the world, is fighting or no. And thirdly he means a war in which he uses all methods for achieving his object.

We still conceive of war as a bad way of settling disputes when all peaceful methods have failed. We think of it as a trade-unionist thinks of a strike—as something wrong in itself, but unfortunately necessary on rare occasions—something we do everything to avoid, something that interrupts our normal methods of behaviour. Hitler's idea is somewhat different. He regards peaceful solutions as cowardly compromises and thinks of total war as the most honourable type of activity so long as there is anyone left to withstand the domination of the German race. If he tries first to achieve his ob-

jectives by peaceful means, that is not because he loves peace, but because he thinks that the other side, which really prefers peace to war, can be usefully induced to concede something without fighting.

"Win the power first, and then negotiate peace, since one cannot overestimate the stupidity of the bourgeoisie," Hitler is quoted as saying to Dr. Rauschning; and again: "I am willing to sign non-aggression pacts with anyone. Why should we not do people the favour of signing treaties, if they are fools enough to suppose that anything is thereby achieved?"¹

It is important to realize the implications of these remarks. They mean that in Hitler's mind war is not unpleasantly accepted when peaceful methods have failed, but a permanent and wholly desirable activity of the German race, and that peaceful diplomacy is merely a sly method of waging war.

The second aspect is equally startling to those who still think in terms of the war of 1914. Ever since the wars between primitive savage tribes there have been laws of war as well as laws of peace—rules of the game which both armies observe. True, these rules have been increasingly often broken, but there is a world of difference between sometimes breaking what you admit to be a rule and utterly despising anyone who recognizes any rules of war at all. But this is precisely Hitler's attitude. For him total war means the adoption, as much in peace-time and towards allies as in open war-

¹ The remarkable quotations given in Dr. Rauschning's *The Voice of Destruction* may be fairly cited as clues to Hitler's mind. We need not assume that all these epigrams fell in this form from Hitler's lips.

fare, of any and every technique for securing an advantage: and the war machine which he has created is one which mobilizes every activity inside Germany and the conquered territory for this purpose. It is not merely that Hitler has added one or two novel weapons to the armoury of war, but rather that he has created an entirely new type of army, which includes not only soldiers, sailors, and airmen but every trader, banker, teacher—in fact, every German and non-German whom he can get into his power. And this colossal war machine, of which the military services are but one feature, is ceaselessly and permanently employed in warfare against the rest of the world—against Italy and Russia, for instance, and anyone else whom Hitler may describe as a friend, but regard as a potential source of opposition.

But it is the third aspect of total war—the disintegration of the states opposed to him—that is the most important. Hitler's real secret weapon is not the rocket gun or poison gas or any other mechanical invention, but the use of revolution as a weapon of war, or the use of war as a method of revolution. Hitler has organized the German nation state as a revolutionary weapon with which to destroy all nation states. Listen once more to the Führer, talking to Dr. Rauschning:

“Don't associate with those bourgeois nationalists. Don't take them more seriously than they deserve. The day of these gentry is past. The bourgeois age is ended. These men are ghosts. Don't let yourself be impressed by their so-called expert knowledge. They don't understand the new world that is arising.”

And again:

"The conception of the nation has become meaningless. The conditions of the time compelled me to begin on the basis of that conception. But I realized from the first that it could only have a transient validity. The nation is a political expedient of democracy and liberalism."

There, clearly stated, is Hitler's first objective, the utter destruction of the nation state. And implicit in this objective is the strategy of revolution as an essential part of war, and therefore as an essential activity of National Socialism as long as it lasts. Hitler's war machine cannot stop making war though it may sign treaties. It must continue its destructive work until its last opponent on this globe has been broken.

"The revolution cannot be ended. It can never be ended. We shall never allow ourselves to be held down to one permanent condition."

Let us sum up the argument. By total war Hitler means the creation of an organization to overthrow, by any and every means, the existing order of society and to impose upon the world the rule of his war machine. Having made international war impossible by destroying all nation states, National Socialism dreams of creating a permanent state of civil war between the ruling German race and the subject millions of the world. That is Hitler's millennium.

What Hitler Learned from the Russians

So far I have shown that the use of revolution as an instrument of war was Hitler's secret weapon. But it is only secret because we have refused to see it and his opponents have been determined to start this war where they left off in 1918. That is one of the disadvantages of winning a war. The victor believes that he won it because of his own merits, and this belief, which the British and the French held, was strengthened by the praise which Hitler showered in *Mein Kampf* on British propaganda. In reality they won the war of 1914 less through their own superior skill than through the mistakes of the Germans and their own vastly greater resources of man-power and materials. Allied propaganda played a very minor part in this victory. Not until 1917 did either the British or the Germans seriously consider the use of revolution as a weapon of war, and when they did, both sides were extremely scared by the revolutions produced. It is also worth remembering that Lord Northcliffe's propaganda only became effective on the western front when the British blockade was beginning to break the German morale. Hitler did not learn much from Northcliffe. His real inspiration was derived from Soviet Russia.

The Russian Communists saw history as a permanent war between rival classes; and when they achieved power in 1917 they very effectively employed revolutionary socialist ideas to disintegrate the German

armies in the east and also to break the morale of the workers in the German factories. Lenin and Trotsky had no army to defend their new society or to attack the capitalist order in the rest of the world. The method they conceived for achieving world revolution was the creation of civilian armies inside the capitalist countries. These civilian armies of workers and peasants were to overthrow the existing order by revolution, and the strategy of that revolution was rigidly controlled by the Russian Communists in the Kremlin through their instrument, the Third International. And how effective this non-military method of warfare was! While the Imperial German armies were advancing deep into a defenceless Russia, the Russians were able to organize strikes all over Germany and the territories occupied by her in protest against the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. And very soon the German armies in Russia were so badly infected by Communist propaganda that they returned home as carriers of that very "disease" with which Ludendorff had boasted he would destroy Czarist Russia. Had the Communists between 1919 and 1921 brought off the Communist Revolution in Germany, as they very nearly did, they might well have achieved a revolutionary victory as spectacular as that which Hitler achieved in 1940.

They failed for three reasons, which did not escape the notice of Hitler. In the first place, because the revolutions which they aroused inside their opponents' territory could not be backed up by Russian military assistance—the defeat of the Russian armies in Poland by General Weygand proved that. Secondly, because

they relied upon Russian methods to organize Western workers and only succeeded in splitting the European labour movements.

The third reason for their failure illustrates an important difference between the Communist and the Nazi outlook. The Russian Communists genuinely desired to liberate the workers and peasants and to improve their conditions. They wanted war and revolution, not as ends in themselves, but in order to achieve peace and social security for mankind. Though Communists often boast of being entirely ruthless in their methods and willing to adopt any means to achieve their ends, they are in fact extremely puritanical in their strategy. Their aim was not simply to disintegrate bourgeois society but to liberate the proletariat; they believed somewhat naïvely that the proletariat all over the world would do this job if it was only clearly explained. They were far too high-minded, at least in the early revolutionary days, to make friends with the mammon of unrighteousness. Their doctrine taught them that the proletariat was the only revolutionary class, and they clung to this though all the evidence was against it. One illustration is sufficient. In 1921 Tukachevsky (the brilliant general later liquidated by Stalin) published a book on Communist military strategy. In this book he developed the idea of parachutists as a method of modern warfare, and noted that "the idea of dropping such detachments in the enemies' rear presupposes that the area is peopled by inhabitants in sympathy with the aerial invaders. . . . The conception must therefore be closely connected with an international socialist

revolution." Tukachevsky took it for granted that only a Communist army could expect to find friendly inhabitants behind the enemies' lines and, what is still more important, assumed that the proletariat in enemy countries would spontaneously welcome the Red parachutists. As a result hundreds of Russian parachutists were dropped in Finland during the recent war and polished off by the infuriated Finns. Hitler is more careful. When he dropped his parachutists in Holland, he did not rely on any spontaneous friendship, but had ready a carefully organized Fifth Column to receive and direct them.

This illustration shows us how much Hitler has learned from the technique of Communist revolution and also what fundamental changes he has introduced into it. He has developed the Communist concept of revolutionary war to end war into the Nazi concept of total war, which shall last until the world is ruled by Germany. Unlike the Communists, he does not regard war and revolution as violent means to the end of peace and universal brotherhood, but as permanent values which will last as long as National Socialism endures.

Methods of Total War

One of our greatest illusions is the belief that Hitler's lightning victories in Poland and in France were merely due to an overwhelming superiority in man-power, tanks, aeroplanes, and military organization. It would be absurd to deny that this superiority played a decisive part in these campaigns, but it would not by itself have brought success unless it had been combined with the

use of Hitler's secret weapon. We have still to ask the questions why the Polish and French generals were entirely incompetent to deal with Hitler's new military tactics; why they themselves had not provided their armies with modern equipment; why the Governments ignominiously broke down; and, most important of all, why the armies themselves displayed so little of the fighting qualities of the Allied armies in the war of 1914 or of the Republican army in the Spanish Civil War.

Part of the answer to the question can be found in a remarkable passage in Dr. Rauschning's book, *The Voice of Destruction*.

Here are parts of a conversation which Herr Rauschning reports took place before 1935: "When I wage war, in the midst of peace, troops will suddenly appear, let us say, in Paris. They will wear French uniforms. No one will stop them. . . . The confusion will be beyond belief. But I shall long have had relations with the men who will form a new Government—a Government to suit me. We shall find such men, we shall find them in every country. We shall not need to bribe them. They will come of their own accord. Ambition and delusion, party squabbles and self-seeking arrogance will drive them. Peace will be negotiated before war has begun. I promise you, gentlemen, that the impossible is always successful."

And here is a passage from a later part of the same conversation: "How to achieve the moral breakdown of the enemy before the war has started—that is the problem that interests me. Whoever has experienced

the war at the front will want to refrain from all avoidable bloodshed. Anything that helps preserve the precious German blood is good. We shall not shrink from the plotting of revolutions. We shall have friends who will help us in all the enemy countries. . . . Of course you know the history of revolutions. It is always the same: the ruling classes capitulate. Why? Defeatism; they have no longer the will to conquer. The lessons of revolution, these are the secrets of the new strategy.

"I shall never start a war without the certainty that a demoralized enemy will succumb to the first stroke of a single gigantic attack. When the enemy is demoralized from within, when he stands on the brink of revolution, when social unrest threatens—that is the right moment. A single blow must destroy him. Aerial attacks, stupendous in their mass effect, surprise, terror, sabotage, assassination from within, the murder of leading men, overwhelming attacks on all weak points of the enemy's defence, sudden attacks, all in the same second without regard for reserves or losses, that is the war of the future.

"Generals, in spite of the lessons of the war, want to behave like chivalrous knights. They think war should be waged like the tourneys of the Middle Ages. I have no use for knights. I need revolutions. I have made the doctrines of revolution the basis of my policy.

"We shall provoke a revolution in France as certainly as we shall not have one in Germany. Take my word for it. The French will hail me as their deliverer. The little man in the middle class will proclaim us as the bearers of a social order and eternal peace. None of

these people any longer want war and greatness. But I want war. . . . I am the one who will wage the war." (Rauschning: *The Voice of Destruction*, Chapter i.)

Before the French collapse this passage sounded like extravagant nonsense to anyone who had overlooked the Nazi technique of total war and had failed therefore to realize that in Hitler's strategy *the actual military attack is merely the culminating point of a long and precisely worked out para-military campaign*. In a very profound sense the Polish and French nations had been defeated before the military campaign started, and the German armies merely gave the *coup de grâce*.

To wage total warfare Hitler has had to create three organizations. First he has built an army, navy, and air force—in the old sense of those words, but equipped with every modern device of warfare. About this I need say little; it is a subject for military experts. But it is worth observing the astonishing co-ordination of all these services and of the different types of weapon and armament within each service achieved by the Nazis. We shall see later that this success is due to certain features in the structure of the Nazi war machine. Secondly, he has assured supplies and equipment to this army through a total war economy and an elastic system of alliances with countries which can provide the necessary raw materials or serve as channels by which they can pass through the enemy blockade.

We can understand the character of Hitler's war economy by contrasting it with Britain's during those lamentable first eight months of war. The British Gov-

ernment tried to equip an army sufficient to withstand the Nazi onslaught while retaining the main features of a peace-time economy. It attempted, in fact, to run a war as an extra activity beside the normal peace-time activities of profit-making. Even more fatal, it apparently imagined that private capital could and would voluntarily organize itself for the task under the guidance of the sleepy routineers in Whitehall. Naturally both the private capitalists and the civil servants failed to do the job. British capitalism for many years has been trying to keep its head above water by a carefully planned policy of limiting production to that quantity which can show profit and by eliminating dangerous rivals in each industry who were inclined to force prices down by expanding production. Thus the principle of British peace-time economy—a principle which it shared with pre-Hitler German economy—was the maintenance of a profitable price level by the creation of scarcity and the rationing of production. It was therefore unreasonable to expect that on the declaration of war British capitalism could of its own accord suddenly reverse the whole policy of the last twenty years and expand production without any regard for the consequences when the war was over. Business-men are as patriotic individuals as any other class, but their premier loyalty is to their firms and to their investors. So long as the Government tried to rearm the country on the basis of orthodox finance and through the private-profit system, business-men were bound to say to themselves: "Of course, purely from the point of view of maximum war production, it might be a good thing to

quadruple this plant, to throw up the contracts we have with our old private clients, X, Y, and Z, and to go all out on war production. But that will spell disaster for the firm when peace comes. We shall be saddled with a vastly larger plant than we require, and we shall have lost all those private clients whose orders we shall need to make any profit when the sword-ordered by the Government for the duration—are beaten into ploughshares.”

This sort of compromise between the interests of private capitalists and the Government’s armament requirements is bound to arise so long as a Government is not prepared to discard the principles of orthodox finance and to order business-men to expand output along the lines required by its armaments program. Hitler had grasped this long ago, and already in 1935 he had enforced in Germany a total war economy under which the whole productive force of German industry and agriculture was mobilized, under State supervision, for the purpose of total war. He did not violently liquidate private capitalism or private profits—very considerable profits are still being made by the great trusts which control the German armament industry—but he did enforce upon German industry and agriculture a war economy in which every private interest was ruthlessly subordinated to the policy of the High Command. For years German business-men have stopped looking ahead and asking what is going to happen to them when the war is over and the colossal armaments plant and costly substitute industries lie idle. As one of them said in 1937, “Germany went bank-

rupt eighteen months ago, but nobody noticed it because we have no free exchange left. Our only resources now are the armaments with which we can collect the booty from each country we conquer. It is no use my talking about profit or loss for my company any more. If Hitler goes on winning I shall go on receiving my salary and a pleasant rake-off in dividends. If he loses, my company's bankruptcy will be one of the least of my troubles. We Germans are all in it together, and it is the fear of what will happen to us, not as capitalists or workers, but as a people that keeps us loyal."

Even in planning the armaments and equipment for total warfare Hitler was carrying out a social revolution. Between 1935 and 1939 private capitalism ceased to be an independent force in Germany: it became a sleeping partner in a State capitalist concern, surrendering its right to control economic policy in exchange for a comfortable livelihood for its directors and positions in the State bureaucracy for its managerial staff. Nazi Germany is neither a capitalist nor a socialist country in the accepted sense of these words; it is a total war machine, in which rich and poor, capital and labour, soldier and civilian are the cogs and flywheels.

But Hitler realized that the creation of the most powerful army and most highly organized war economy in the world was not enough for his purpose. Two more things were needed: an instrument with which to discipline the mind of every inhabitant of the Third Reich; and an instrument with which to disintegrate the spirit of every nation which opposed or was a danger

to the Third Reich. These two instruments, which we can personify as the Gestapo and the Fifth Column, are far more closely connected than many people suppose.

We are used to the idea that a soldier when he is in uniform is entirely subject to the orders of his superiors; we are not shocked to realize that the spit and polish and parade-ground marching to which the professional soldier is subjected are intended to give him automatic reflexes so that in the hour of battle he will not be an individual with individual fears but a unit in his regiment. Hitler has grasped the idea behind this training of the professional soldier and tries to apply it to every man, woman, and child in the Third Reich. He has created a civilian army with its own civilian privates, N.C.O.'s, officers and generals. The privates are the workers, peasants, doctors, bankers, and business-men. The N.C.O.'s are the lower grades of the party bureaucracy, the S.A., the Labour Front, and so on. The officers are the S.S., and the generals in this field are the Nazi high-ups, pre-eminent among them Dr. Goebbels. It is not merely that the Nazis through the schools, the press, the radio, the films, the Strength through Joy, and all the other organs of propaganda have a complete monopoly control of public opinion. Even more important, they use this control to inculcate a sense of absolute obedience to discipline so that the privates automatically obey the N.C.O.'s, the N.C.O.'s the officers, and the officers the generals. And the German civilian private has the same attitude to Hitler as a private in the army to a general. Partly he is proud

of the army in which he plays a purely passive part, partly he knows that the least insubordination means punishment. Pride and hopelessness play equal parts in creating the loyalty of the citizens of the Third Reich.

Having thus created a civilian army of eighty million people and utterly destroyed any spontaneous expression of public opinion, the Nazis found it necessary to create an organization to discover precisely what the public was feeling and to suppress opposition. That organization is the Gestapo with its ancillaries, the *Blockwahrte* and the *Volksmeldedienst*. Only one of the functions of the Gestapo is to keep a watch on the enemies of the system; another, equally important, is to watch the barometer of public morale and to report on the reactions of the masses both to Nazi home policy and to influences from abroad. To believe that the Gestapo is an organization of the same sort as the British Secret Service is to underestimate the one and to overestimate the other. The Secret Service is a military and detective organization, strictly under military control. The Gestapo is a political organization, and its members are trained to understand political and social problems of which the British Secret Service by training and by inclination has no understanding. The British Secret Service, within its narrow limits, is possibly as efficient as it was in 1914-18; it is not expected to perform those services for which Herr Himmler's henchmen have been specially trained. They keep a careful watch, not only upon the non-political masses, but on the Nazi bureaucracy, including the highest officials and statesmen—we should not forget that one thousand

leading Nazis lost their lives in the blood bath of 1934—and they are also active in work outside Germany for the performance of which the British have not even begun to organize a department. The dossiers of Mussolini and Franco, Hitler's Italian and Spanish Gauleiters, of M. Laval, of King Carol, of leading American politicians, are of course in their possession to be used for blackmail, should the need arise. But they also have a line on countless minor officials, politicians, and business-men in every country of the world as well as on every German man, woman, and child outside the Third Reich. They are, in fact, an essential instrument of Hitler's total war which enables him to employ in the service of the Nazis hundreds and thousands of men and women who have no notion that they are being so employed. In Holland parachutists were captured with lists of names and addresses both of those to be shot and of those they could rely on. That is a tiny indication of the efficiency of the Gestapo.

I have said that it is silly to compare the Gestapo with the British Secret Service. The true comparison is with the Ogpu in Russia and the Third International outside. But even here we only compare in order to contrast. Since 1920 the Kremlin has ostensibly been organizing world revolution in every country of the world through the Communist Parties under the direction of the Third International and the surveyance of the Ogpu. In fact, since 1925 the Third International has been the Cinderella of the Russian state. Communist Parties abroad have received very meagre financial support and have spent most of their energies

in squabbling with the labour and trade-union leaders. The Russians are primarily interested in solving the social problems of the U.S.S.R. and raising the standard of living of its inhabitants. They really ceased to be active revolutionaries with the first Five-Year Plan and the decision to create Socialism in one country. It is the Nazis who have become the really active agents of social revolution. But with this difference—the Nazis are not interested in any particular social revolution. Their sole concern is so to disintegrate and divide the peoples of the various countries that when the German army strikes, resistance is negligible. They stir up revolution and discontent, not for the sake of any particular class or party, but as part of a war strategy whose final objective is the subordination of every class and party and every country to Germany.

It is unnecessary here to enumerate all the methods by which Hitler undermined the national unity of his opponents, prevented their rearmament, and persuaded them to connive at his own rearmament. Nor would it be profitable to distribute praise and blame. Every party and every class in every European country bears its share of the blame, though naturally the heaviest responsibility rests upon the national leaders. Our interest is not to accuse but to understand the strategy of National Socialist warfare and to realize that in this new total warfare the military blow is only the culminating stroke delivered when the main work has been done by the secret weapon of social disintegration. Hitler once ironically stated that he was the most humane of all war-lords since he never used military force

when his end could be accomplished by other means. What he meant is clear. He was able to disarm his most powerful and dangerous eastern neighbour, Czechoslovakia, without striking a blow, by persuading France and Britain to force his terms upon the Czechs. In order to destroy Poland he needed a short but extremely expensive campaign. Though he certainly found satisfaction in the swift physical destruction wrought by his armies, he is sensible enough to prefer the more economical use of intrigue, by which, for instance, he has brought Spain and Italy to a condition of dependence on Germany. He has, in fact, modified Clausewitz's famous dictum: "War is the continuation of foreign policy." It now runs: "*Military operations are best used to consummate and celebrate the victories already achieved by the weapons of secret warfare.*"

Hitler's New European Order

Dr. Rauschning has described the Nazi revolution as the revolution of destruction. But this phrase describes only one half of Hitler's activity, the disintegration of civilization as we know it. The other half is the creation first in Europe and then in other parts of the world of a new National Socialist order. In order to develop our own war strategy we must see the shape of the new world which Hitler is trying to create. Since the whole of Europe is now under his control—conquered as much by abdication as by military victory—it is possible to form a fairly complete picture. The old nation states with their hard and fast frontiers and independent governments have been destroyed; in their

place there rises a new empire with a supra-national bureaucracy, composed of men of many nationalities, but centred at Berlin. Wherever possible in the conquered countries Hitler relies on the services of the men who have capitulated. They *must* remain loyal to him for fear of their countrymen's anger when they discover what has happened; and Hitler, unlike Sir John Anderson, can and does trust foreigners up to a point, when he knows that they have good reason to be loyal to him. The Italian Fascist Party, for instance, the Spanish Phalangists, and the Pétain Government can all be relied upon to serve their master well, because they know what their fate would be if the Nazis were overthrown. In Czechoslovakia and in Poland, so far, Hitler has not been able to find many gentlemen who will do the job of pretending to be an independent Government; and for this reason he has had to rely very largely on a German administration. The same is true of Austria, where after the first few weeks the Austrian Nazis were found so unreliable that Prussians had to be placed in control. But of course all these Governments and officials, like the Government and officials inside Germany itself are under constant observation by the Gestapo, and are impotent to resist since they have no forces at their disposal strong enough to withstand the German army. The whole of Europe, including Germany, is occupied by the German army and the Gestapo.

In this new Continental empire we can recognize the germs of a four-class state. At the top stand the Nazi war-lords, with their palaces and retinues of retainers,

the provincial governors, the heads of all the endless party bureaux, and the Gauleiters outside Germany in each of the occupied or unoccupied territories. This is the new ruling class of a united Europe. Second come the masses of the German people and the German army. Though they are now mere cogs in the war machine, they enjoy a somewhat privileged position since it is important still to persuade them that they have been liberated from the thralldom of Versailles. For this reason they are deliberately given a social position superior to the other peoples of Europe, and, even more important, every country in Europe is stripped of food and all other consumers' goods in order that they may be able to enjoy something of the fruits of victory. Third come the rest of the European peoples. They are treated on the most shameless model ever applied by empires to colonial peoples. Quite deliberately the Nazis have pursued a policy of de-industrializing the countries which they conquer or, if that is not possible, of putting the control of industry into German hands. Then non-German European peoples are in the Third Reich to provide the raw materials and the foodstuffs for the industry and the homes of the ruling German race. Within a few days of the establishment of the Pétain Government it was forced to make the remarkable statement that France, over half of whose inhabitants worked on the land, was an over-industrialized nation. Thus the fate of the non-German peoples of Europe is to become peasants and miners, hewers of wood and drawers of water for God's chosen German people. The fourth class in the Third Reich has yet to be formed.

It consists of the peoples in the colonial territories overseas. These peoples, as all leading Nazi spokesmen agree, will no longer be treated as human beings but as sub-men, or, to use the phrase which the old Greek philosopher framed, they will be treated as living tools, mere labour-power for the production of those resources of tropical areas which will be necessary to strengthen and embellish the structure of Hitler's new civilization.

Such is the future in store for the peoples of the world if Adolf Hitler has his way. It is noteworthy that a precisely similar picture is envisaged by the war-lords who control Japanese policy and are determined to create an Empire similar to the Third Reich in the Pacific. Perhaps the only difference between them and the Nazis is that, though the Germans have practised most types of mental and physical cruelty upon their opponents and are now doing their best to exterminate the Polish people, they have not, so far as we know, deliberately introduced opium into their conquered territories in order to sap the vitality of their victims. But this is what the Japanese have done.

In the twenty years between the foundation of the Nazi Party and 1940 Hitler has gone far towards achieving his dream. Today the whole of Europe, from the northernmost point of Norway to the southern coast of Spain and Italy, from the western shores of Brittany to those Balkan marches where Stalin still disputes his sway, is now under the control of the Nazi war machine. Let me once more repeat that this astonishing series of conquests has been achieved at the cost of two mili-

tary campaigns, one lasting a fortnight, the other under five weeks. We can add a third if we care to reckon the occupation of Norway as a military campaign. The striking fact is not the success of the purely military strategy of the German campaigns, brilliantly designed though it was, but the perfectly prepared political campaign which preceded them. I do not underestimate the strength or importance of the Nazi army, but no objective observer can deny that it was the preliminary use of Hitler's secret weapon that made his military successes possible and that is the unique and novel element in the new strategy of total warfare.

From this outline of Hitler's strategy we can already draw one vital conclusion. If the Nazis are to be defeated, it will not merely be by an old-fashioned blockade or by an old-fashioned military campaign, however brilliantly conducted. To achieve a victory the revolutionary weapon must be turned against the Nazis, and the social structure of the Third Reich disintegrated as methodically as Hitler destroyed the spirit of France before he launched his tanks and aeroplanes against the French army. If I am right in suggesting that there are many ways of losing the war, we have already discovered one of them. It is to continue to believe that we shall succeed if we start where we left off in 1918. To do this will lead us to disaster as surely as pitting a Lee-Enfield rifle against a modern tank.

Two Rival Strategies

When we look at Great Britain from the point of view of a Continental dictator, it appears to be an insignificant group of islands off the west coast of Europe. Indeed, the only obstacle to its annihilation is the small belt of sea which divides it from the mainland. But when we view the strategic situation through the eyes of a maritime power, we get an entirely different picture. Now, instead of an insignificant group of islands huddled on the edge of the mainland, we see a fortress, invincible unless its naval power is broken, from which a deadly counter-offensive can be launched. To a seagoing people the sea is not an obstacle but a means of communication, and to the south and west of Great Britain stretch the oceans over which British ships travel to their own Empire and to all the other countries of the world. That three thousand miles divide them from the American continent is not a weakness but a strength so long as they maintain command of the sea. For those three thousand miles of sea ensure that the wheat-fields, the oil-wells, the steel-plants and the armament-works of Canada and the U.S.A. are beyond the range of German bombing planes. Instead of a Britain beleaguered by a Nazi Europe, we see a Nazi Europe beleaguered by the rest of the world, and Britain becomes not the last remote fastness of European freedom but the bridgehead over which the free peoples of the New World can pass in their campaign against the Third Reich. These are the geographical and stra-

tegic grounds for a reasoned confidence that in due course Britain can pass from the defensive to the offensive in the present war.

There is a school of thought which bases its strategy solely upon these considerations of naval power, and hopes to achieve victory by means of the blockade, aided by the work of British bomber aircraft in its destruction of German transport and productive capacity. The upholders of this view believe that, if we can starve Europe out and then launch a gigantic military invasion, we shall achieve ultimate victory. Such people are still thinking in terms of the last war, and refuse to reckon either with the new political situation or with Hitler's secret weapon. The British blockade may possibly cause starvation among the peoples of Europe this winter. But the German people will not starve as long as the Nazis can plunder the rest of Europe. And there are already abundant signs that Hitler plans first to strip Europe bare of all the food and the commodities which she possesses in order to keep his own people reasonably satisfied, and then to denounce the British blockade as responsible for the famine. Since the rest of the world is already suffering by the loss of its export trade to Europe, it will not be difficult for him to appeal to the United States and other neutral countries, begging them to help Europe in its distress, and blaming that distress upon "British plutocracy." American business-men might find it very hard to resist an appeal to their hearts which also replenished their empty pockets. Thus the blockade by itself might have as its chief effects the creation in Europe of bitter anti-

British feelings, and in the neutral countries across the seas of a humanitarian desire to relieve European distress. In the eyes of the world Britain could be made to appear a selfish, imperialist power, uselessly prolonging the war, brutally starving Europe, and creating for the neutral countries overseas considerable problems of unemployment and over-production.

Two consequences would follow. In the first place Britain might forfeit the sympathy of the U.S.A. which it so urgently needs; in the second place it would make immeasurably more difficult the military invasion of Europe which the British hope to launch. Instead of coming as liberators to the oppressed peoples, they would be received as the representatives of the power responsible for their starvation and might find a Europe unified not only in its slavery to the Third Reich but in its hatred of the British. As for the third hope that the British bomber aircraft can seriously damage the German war machine—however much aircraft-production may be increased and whatever the skill of British pilots, they cannot hope to do more than cause minor damage, which can in time be repaired. The Third Reich is now so extensive that the Nazis can remove their most vital armament factories to places outside the range of British air bombers. Aerial attack can be an effective method of hampering invasion; it can never by itself become a sufficient counter-offensive. One of the functions of aerial attack is to undermine civilian morale. Incessant bombing may produce defeatism. But here again we must observe that this defeatism is of little use to the British unless they turn it into posi-

tive revolutionary activity against the rulers of the Third Reich.

There is one more extremely unpleasant consequence of this old-fashioned strategy of blockade combined with military offensive which we must bear in mind. In a recent speech Mr. Churchill expressed the hope that Britain would be able to take the offensive in 1942, and one Government spokesman after another has told the nation that they, unlike the Nazis, are prepared for a long war. But to be prepared for a long war against the National Socialists Britain must be immune from the deadly effects of Hitler's secret weapon. The Nazis were able to break the French morale not only because they themselves were expert revolutionaries, but because there were grievous social evils in France. They did not make the rifts between class and class, but drove wedges into rifts which already existed. Can we be sure that no such rifts are to be found in Britain today? If they exist—and they certainly do—they would anyway be deepened by the long strain of beating off the Nazi attacks and preparing for an offensive years ahead. We can be perfectly certain that between now and 1942 the Nazis will be working day and night to disintegrate British national unity as they disintegrated French national unity in the first eight months of the war. We have seen how the mere action of mobilizing industry and agriculture for war in itself creates a social revolution and may compel a total planning of economic life. War faces us with an inescapable dilemma: either in order to achieve victory we accept revolutionary changes, or we reject those

changes and conscientiously or unconscientiously accept defeat. Those whose fear of revolution is stronger than their will to victory become in the tension of a long war the agents and accomplices of the other side. The Nazis have shown that they understand this law of modern society and know how to employ it in their war strategy.

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that a determination to continue this war where it left off in 1918 is tantamount to renouncing victory. In Europe it will produce not a willingness to accept the British as liberators, but a united will to resist their selfish aggression; overseas it will lose them the sympathies of benevolent neutrals; at home it will produce the social crisis which Hitler will be able to exploit in order to evolve a peace party ready to capitulate to his wishes. The alternative strategy is not difficult to see, to continue the blockade and the air offensive on Germany as well as preparation for a military offensive, but *to combine them on the largest possible scale with revolutionary activities inside Europe*. One hundred million peoples suffer under the tyranny of the Nazi war-lords. The British can make them, or at least the bravest of them, their allies if they pledge their country to the cause of European revolution and build in Britain an organization through which that revolution can be brought about.

Imagine for a moment that this organization is in being and already at work, that in every country in Europe there are men and women in contact with their comrades in Britain and collaborating in the war against

the Nazis. Then the very size of Hitler's Third Reich becomes an immense liability. Hitler has boasted that he controls the coastline of Europe from the northern cape of Norway to the Spanish frontier. If among the peoples who live along that coast men and women are working with the British who are prepared to risk their lives, the Nazi war machine will suddenly be thrown on the defensive. If the coastline of Europe offers countless ports and harbours from which to attack England, it offers innumerable creeks and inlets by which the agents of European revolution can pass to and fro. If by occupying Denmark and Holland Hitler can hope to feed his people at home, the British in their turn, by turning his own secret weapon against him, can make it impossible for a German soldier to go out at night in an occupied land. If Hitler can solve his labour shortage by sending his press gangs into Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Holland, those Polish, Czech, and Dutch workers, transported to Germany against their will, can become a Fifth Column indeed. If the Gestapo, to preserve law and order, throw more than a quarter of a million German citizens into concentration camps, the British can know that they have a quarter of a million potential friends.

We have seen that the new European order which Hitler is building is based upon the eternal warfare between the Nazi bureaucracy and the peoples it exploits. So far the Nazis have hidden their own internal weakness by a series of offensives against other countries. They have built up a myth of their own invincibility and of the unity within the Reich because no

great power—not even Russia—has seriously tried to organize revolutionary activity against them. But the larger the Third Reich grows, the weaker its unity, the greater its social stresses, and the more numerous are the points from which it may be attacked. Hitlerism is not only an idol with feet of clay, but an idol constructed of cracking clay from the neck down.

Even today, when the work of revolution has still not begun, there is overwhelming evidence that the spirit of opposition still exists in the empire of Hitler and his foreign Gauleiters. The Czechs, in spite of their betrayal by the western powers, remain a nation united by its hatred of the Nazis, with an elaborate underground network of conspiracy, only waiting for full use. In spite of daily executions, General Franco has been unable to exterminate the revolutionary elements in Spain. There are thousands of dynamiterminers in the Asturias, of Catalan and Basque nationalists, and of revolutionary workers and peasants all over Spain. Franco has a permanent political prison population of about a million. In Italy there are active anti-Fascists among workers and intellectuals, active syndicalists among the peasants as well as a potential Catholic opposition and a general apathy towards the war. In Holland there is plenty of evidence that the industrial workers, through their organizations have been driven underground, have kept their democratic and socialist spirit alive and acquired through oppression a readiness for violence. In Norway the farmers of the north have much the spirit of the Boers in South Africa, and with a little ammunition could make life

extremely unpleasant for a German army of occupation, while the townspeople, especially in the ports, were always radical and anti-Nazi in sentiment. We have already evidence of the quality of the Norwegian seamen. Only a few days after the seizure of Norway by the Nazis the leaders of the Norwegian Seamen's Union arrived in London and concerted their plans with their British colleagues. It was the Seamen's Union that telegraphed to the seven thousand whalers returning from the Antarctic with their annual catch and ensured that the whole fleet should make for British ports. The solidarity of the Seamen's Unions has ensured to Britain an enormous addition to the strength of the merchant marine. And it is not difficult to see the part which the Seamen's International would play in a revolutionary war against dictatorship. Lastly, in Germany, in spite of seven years of uninterrupted Nazi successes, there are still small but determined groups among the industrial workers who maintain their trade-union tradition, while the vast majority of the peasants and workers give only a lifeless and apathetic support to the Nazi regime. In the Nazi Party itself there are the disillusioned idealists and countless embittered, disappointed men. It should be possible to create small units of a secret civilian army in Germany able and willing to collaborate with the foreign imported labour and to become centres of disaffection when the public morale is lowered this winter by the disappointment of a long war.

It is obviously unwise to publish any detailed account of the potential sources of opposition in Hitler's New

Europe. All that is necessary is to show that such sources exist and to suggest that it is possible to create an organization in Britain which will enable them to collaborate in winning this war. Their function will be to defeat the spirit of the Third Reich before the military offensive is launched, just as Hitler's agents defeated the spirit of France before his generals launched their attack on Sedan. The thing can be done. It must be done if the British are going to win.

Many readers probably will gladly agree that such revolutionary activity is obviously desirable. But things are not quite so simple as that. If the British are going to take part in organizing revolution in Europe they must realize certain failings in themselves. Ever since the formation of the Churchill-Labour Government public attention and criticism has been concentrated on the Ministries concerned with Supply, and it has been widely assumed that once these Ministries are in running order they can get on with the job of winning the war. Other Ministries have escaped criticism because their function did not seem to be immediately concerned with the war effort. The Foreign Office, the Home Office, and the Ministry of Information have been regarded as of secondary importance compared with the Ministries of Supply, Labour, and Aircraft-Production. This attitude did no harm in the early weeks of the new Government, but now it must be realized that it is not only on the production side that failure has been dangerous and spectacular. If the British set themselves to the task of European revolution it will mean a drastic overhaul of their foreign

extremely unpleasant for a German army of occupation, while the townspeople, especially in the ports, were always radical and anti-Nazi in sentiment. We have already evidence of the quality of the Norwegian seamen. Only a few days after the seizure of Norway by the Nazis the leaders of the Norwegian Seamen's Union arrived in London and concerted their plans with their British colleagues. It was the Seamen's Union that telegraphed to the seven thousand whalers returning from the Antarctic with their annual catch and ensured that the whole fleet should make for British ports. The solidarity of the Seamen's Unions has ensured to Britain an enormous addition to the strength of the merchant marine. And it is not difficult to see the part which the Seamen's International would play in a revolutionary war against dictatorship. Lastly, in Germany, in spite of seven years of uninterrupted Nazi successes, there are still small but determined groups among the industrial workers who maintain their trade-union tradition, while the vast majority of the peasants and workers give only a lifeless and apathetic support to the Nazi regime. In the Nazi Party itself there are the disillusioned idealists and countless embittered, disappointed men. It should be possible to create small units of a secret civilian army in Germany able and willing to collaborate with the foreign imported labour and to become centres of disaffection when the public morale is lowered this winter by the disappointment of a long war.

It is obviously unwise to publish any detailed account of the potential sources of opposition in Hitler's New

Europe. All that is necessary is to show that such sources exist and to suggest that it is possible to create an organization in Britain which will enable them to collaborate in winning this war. Their function will be to defeat the spirit of the Third Reich before the military offensive is launched, just as Hitler's agents defeated the spirit of France before his generals launched their attack on Sedan. The thing can be done. It must be done if the British are going to win.

Many readers probably will gladly agree that such revolutionary activity is obviously desirable. But things are not quite so simple as that. If the British are going to take part in organizing revolution in Europe they must realize certain failings in themselves. Ever since the formation of the Churchill-Labour Government public attention and criticism has been concentrated on the Ministries concerned with Supply, and it has been widely assumed that once these Ministries are in running order they can get on with the job of winning the war. Other Ministries have escaped criticism because their function did not seem to be immediately concerned with the war effort. The Foreign Office, the Home Office, and the Ministry of Information have been regarded as of secondary importance compared with the Ministries of Supply, Labour, and Aircraft-Production. This attitude did no harm in the early weeks of the new Government, but now it must be realized that it is not only on the production side that failure has been dangerous and spectacular. If the British set themselves to the task of European revolution it will mean a drastic overhaul of their foreign

policy, of their propaganda, of the Home Office, and also of certain departments of the War Office. Next winter is the time when revolutionary activity should start. In order to have their secret weapon ready for the winter propaganda season they must begin the overhaul at once.



CHAPTER II

THE FOREIGN OFFICE MACHINE

I HAVE said enough to show that the Nazi challenge is new both in its intensity and in its nature. A powerful state is organized under a single direction for the purpose of disintegrating and overwhelming other states. If there are departmental quarrels between the foreign and home and financial organs of the state, they are ironed out by the final authority of Hitler and his close advisers. The departments do not work separately, but each is subordinate to a single purpose. Thus in the Balkans or in South America it is impossible to separate Nazi trade policy from Nazi foreign policy; they are not merely related, they are integrated. Every trade bargain is designed to purchase power in the states that come to an agreement; every international treaty rivets on the state that accepts it the political and commercial hold of the Nazi machine. Compare

this for a moment with democratic methods. Trade notoriously follows the flag, and capitalist expansion has often carried with it the threat of political domination. But with the capitalist democracies this is a slow process and by no means inevitable. As long as conditions are good for the British investor the government and political life of even colonial countries are not undermined. In the Argentine, for instance, the British Government is content to protect the interests of its nationals and keep on good terms with the Argentinian Government. The Foreign Office is on good terms with the Government, and is only occasionally involved in the business affairs of its nationals. The Board of Trade, the Treasury, the Foreign Office, and the rest work separately, co-operating occasionally and not always smoothly. It is no wonder that since 1933 there have been complaints from countries in many parts of the world of a new form of Nazi penetration, of hard bargains, in which Germany has used her debtor position to force states to receive surplus exports that they little wanted in exchange for commodities necessary for building up the Reich. Rumanian or Yugoslavian business-men had the choice of getting nothing at all in exchange for their bloc marks or doing what they could with record consignments of aspirin and mouth organs. At the same time in each of these bargains the German community was strengthened and given further opportunities for Nazi propaganda. The Nazi drive is totalitarian—the drive of the whole state—aiming at the total disintegration of the smaller state which is some

day or other to fall into the Nazi orbit with or without the formality of war.

In foreign relations, then, you cannot separate the German departments of state. In England they have their own tradition and often even their separate policies. Since the main desire of countries like England and France, politically democratic and economically capitalist, has been to maintain their privileged position undisturbed, they have necessarily been on the defensive. Their very virtues have been their weakness, and it is weakness on which Hitler always plays. They have long ago found a partial solution for the problem of conflicting interests in the state; the democratic and parliamentary system recognizes differences and attempts to avoid both civil war and tyranny by offering classes, and the parties built upon them, a peaceful and rational method of settling their disputes. Great Britain, long integrated and imbued with an insular confidence in its perpetual security, has acquired the democratic and civilized idea that every problem can be solved in a more or less rational way. There are complaints, grievances, and dangers in the industrial world? Very well, then, appoint a royal commission, hear the evidence of all sides, write a report, and present it to the Cabinet and the public. There is trouble in the international world? Obtain expert memoranda on the British interests involved, find out what the rival country wants, and seek a bargain, a conciliatory formula; or, if necessary, let the League or some other international body look for a solution. The problem,

in a word, can be stated, weighed, and solved. The stronger party will get the best of it, but there will be an element of reason and concession, which may reconcile the weaker party to the solution.

Let us clearly understand that the whole of this conception of "problems" and "solutions," which the British have not even abandoned in this war, is utterly alien to Hitler's mind. Never in the whole story of the Nazi movement is there recorded a single bargain that was intended as a "fair solution" of any difficulty. Hitler will have his will. If he is not strong enough to win it today, then he will pretend friendship with his enemy until, as he remarked to his friend Ludecke, he is "strong enough to destroy him." Never for a moment has Hitler left off fighting; never for a moment has he been satisfied with anything less than total domination. Sir Nevile Henderson, Britain's Ambassador during the final period which led up to the war, informs us that Hitler was angry and disappointed after Munich. It could be said that he had compromised, that he had been contented with a poor bargain when by war he might have won the whole at one blow. However that may be, we saw on March 15, 1939 that while Mr. Chamberlain had been looking for a "solution" of the Sudeten problem, Hitler had merely used the position of the Sudeten Germans as a weapon with which to undermine the resistance of the Czechs and their democratic allies. He had always meant to seize the whole Czechoslovakia. In exactly the same way he seeks to use the tolerance, the comparative decency, the uneasy conscience, the division of rich and poor, and all the

other good and bad features of democratic life, not in order to solve the problem of relations between Germany and Britain, but in order to undermine and eventually dominate Britain. That is what has made it so difficult for us all to understand the Nazi advance. We talk of problems and solutions; Hitler thinks exclusively in terms of war. When we say we stand for reason and order in the world we mean just this: that we desire to re-establish a situation in which there will again be problems and governments that are prepared to seek for their solution.

Gentlemen versus Players

This conception of a continual war conducted in peace was beyond the imagination of the British Foreign Office. Remember that it is a long-established organization, with its own routine and etiquette, with its personnel drawn almost exclusively from the older universities and from a few great public schools. Remember that it assumed that Britain was the greatest power in the world and that it had learned the efficacy of its diplomatic technique for safeguarding British interests. It relied on suave language, into which mention of the ultimate sanction of the British navy was seldom allowed to intrude. It assumed a similar attitude on the part of the diplomats of other countries. In every capital of Europe there existed a select diplomatic society. Embassies dined with one another and invited the distinguished, influential, and well-to-do citizens of the states to which they were accredited into their pleasant and exclusive circle. If there was secret-

service work to be done that did not bear inspection, that was elaborately not within the cognizance of His Majesty's ambassador.

Such diplomacy is played according to strict rules. Nobody must speak out of turn; promotions follow the rules of seniority; it is assumed that diplomats, like other civil servants, can loyally co-operate in policies with which they do not agree. No doubt they do, but correct behaviour and formal loyalty are no substitute for drive and enthusiasm. There are strict rules of etiquette and procedure; memoranda have to be sent to the right person, and no stage in the hierarchy must be stepped over. Innovations are frowned on; there is an elaborate diplomatic language which in private as well as in public smooths out the sharp edges of an awkward situation. All this has its use in a stable world. It serves excellently to maintain the status quo. The edge of many a quarrel that might prove dangerous is blunted by courtesy, suave words, and procrastination. It is only when a rude interloper, intent on change at any cost, breaks into the charmed circle that the weaknesses are exposed. Diplomatic statesmen confronted with the new diplomats appointed by dictators remind me of an English tennis champion who said plaintively after the last war, when the new brood of smashing tennis players came from the United States, that he felt as if he had all his life been playing pat-ball. Skill, experience, and endurance—he had all these; but these virile young men from over the seas had something else—an almost unsporting determination to win. At such times in diplomacy, as in tennis, the established tech-

nique of the acknowledged expert may be a disadvantage. No doubt in the last year people have sometimes attributed to incompetence or malice actions which are really to be explained in terms of habits that no longer fit the new situation. I recall one case in which there was urgent need for the British Foreign Office to recognize a new Ambassador abroad. A long and serious loss of time occurred, not, as some thought, because the Foreign Office did not wish to accredit the new Ambassador, but because it was not possible to send credentials which included the King's signature by telegraph, and because it took some time to discover another way of accomplishing an arrangement for which there was no later precedent than the reign of Queen Anne.

The Bolsheviks first introduced a discordant note into this charmed circle, and, in their fear that Soviet Embassies might be used as diplomatic cover for revolutionary activities, many of the capitalist countries preferred not to have any diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. But these same countries were very loath to realize that Hitler's Germany, which they believed the great bulwark against Bolshevism in central Europe, could use similar tactics. The German diplomats were still the educated gentlemen that they had known before the Nazis came to power. The British hid from the world, and indeed from themselves, ugly suspicions that there was something new and sinister about Nazi diplomacy; that even in the German Embassy in London a Minister, whose friendship with Britain was genuine, died suddenly a death that was

Marshal Göring to meet the King of Yugoslavia; there is a revealing account of Sir Neville's success in shooting stags at Göring's country estate; there are reflections on the excellence of Nazi labour camps and on the great administrative achievements of some of the Nazi leaders, including those of the man who finally abolished the whole legal basis of the German judicial system. Sir Neville's one idea of peace-making was to make friends with the more respectable Nazis like General Blomberg and Baron von Neurath, who he fondly believed might exert real influence in Germany in favour of peace. Most of all he trusted his intimacy with Göring, who exerted his influence with the Führer in favour of a bloodless settlement at Munich. If Field-Marshal Göring had had as much moral as physical courage, says Sir Neville, he would have attempted to play the same role on the eve of the war in Poland. He admits that Göring would always have been loyal to the Führer, but he seems to have cherished the hope that war could be indefinitely postponed by an endless number of Munichs, by which Hitler would have won the territories that he wanted without war. Of course Sir Neville Henderson would not have applied this theory when the time came for direct demands to be made on France or Britain. That would have been at least consistent and would have avoided war at the cost of making the whole of Europe, including Britain, subservient to Nazi power. But that clearly was not what he desired. Throughout his whole book he displays an extreme fear of socialism and, above all, of the U.S.S.R. This fear in the minds of the British ruling

class was, throughout, the best card in Hitler's hands. Until the last minute when Germany actually succeeded in making a treaty with Russia, many of them saw only one way out: to make friends with the Nazis, who, they always assumed, would prefer a joint war against Russia to a war in the west. This conception continued even after Britain had declared war on Germany, and it has never really left the minds of some people in high positions in that country even today.

I have given some indication of the atmosphere of the British Foreign Office and of the reasons why it could not cope with Fascist states which knew what they wanted and were prepared to use any means to obtain it. This inability to understand and face the meaning of Fascism has been shown in each of the great international conflicts since 1931. We none of us want to hear the story of Manchuria and Abyssinia and Spain and Austria and Czechoslovakia and China told all over again. But though many books have been written on the democratic failure to withstand Fascism, the public does not yet understand the factors that have been common to these defeats. Let me summarize one of these instances.

The Way of Failure

While there was still a League of Nations, in which the hopes of the more intelligent part of mankind were centred, the various Foreign Offices could not disregard Geneva; and we hoped they would not exploit it for their own national purposes. Today, as we look back, it is clear that this was a lot to expect. It meant, that

institutions developed to further purely national interests had suddenly to subordinate themselves to an international purpose. The inevitable happened. The diplomats merely adapted to conditions at Geneva their familiar technique and sought through the League to pursue their traditional purposes. Never for a moment did they take seriously mankind's aspirations for a new type of international government. When the Manchurian issue arose in 1931, they did not see in it the first great test of the League's ability to deal with an act of aggression. Their idea was to delay in order to avoid trouble. When the conflict of public opinion became acute, they readily listened to Tokyo diplomats who told them that China was a country of bandits and that trade would be better for all the capitalist nations if Japan took over Manchuria; they smiled at more farsighted people who saw that it was just because Japan viewed with alarm the improvement in Chinese government that she began an invasion which at a later stage China might well be able to repel. They could not believe that in the long run China might be a better friend than Japan. Even the publication of the Tanaka Memorial, which outlined a policy of complete domination of the Far East by Japan, was disregarded; the old diplomacy scouted this program as the impossible dream of a few wild men and preferred to rely on an elaborate scheme of diplomatic manoeuvre designed to increase the power of the so-called liberal elements in Japan. Behind the Foreign Office were big-business representatives in the House of Commons and elsewhere who feared Bolshevism and thought they could

collaborate with Japan in sharing the spoils of China. They were not even disillusioned about Japan's "open door" policy when a Federation of British Industries mission went out to Japan and Manchuria only to discover that Japan was slamming the door very firmly in their faces. And when Japan began her terrible war on China proper in 1937, the same influences were at work. The Foreign Office preference for Japan was the natural result of the interplay of forces: the stronger power won because business favoured it. A large part of the public, profoundly pacifist, supported a policy that looked like keeping Britain out of war. The result was a divided policy. Friendship was expressed for China in deference to British sympathy for the victim of aggression. At the same time an elaborate game was played behind the scenes by people who shared with Japan a fear of the popular forces in China and Europe alike and who assumed that Japan would act as a bulwark against Soviet Russia in the Far East. Today the full fruits of this policy have matured.

As the situation became more difficult in Europe, Japan's demands grew more pressing. Britain gave way on each issue. The four Chinese who had taken refuge in the British Concession were handed over to Japan. The Japanese still blockaded Tientsin and stripped and humiliated British subjects as a new form of blackmail. Sir Robert Craigie invented a formula which implied recognition of Japan's rights as conqueror of northern China. When, after a long period of delay, Britain gave way about the silver reserve in Tientsin, Japan demanded that it should close the

Burma Road, one of the main back doors through which the materials of war could flow to China. Recently Japan tried to make Britain party to a Japanese peace in China, and, since Britain obviously cannot "take on" Japan as well as Germany and Italy, the British Government could do no more than protest when British citizens were arrested and, apparently, tortured in Tokyo. Called upon to defend the decision to close the Burma Road, Mr. Churchill was obviously unhappy. He had for years led the protest against the policy which had brought Britain to its present pass. No doubt he was also alarmed at the probable reactions in America. There, even more obviously than at home, the policy of surrender to Japan was seen to be in contradiction to the spirit of Mr. Churchill's words in his broadcast of July 14, 1940, when he said that Britain must "so fight the war that all the oppressed countries in Europe may feel that each British victory is a step towards the liberation of the Continent from the foulest thralldom into which it has ever been cast." Here was Britain not merely admitting that she was powerless to resist Japan, but actually seeking an illusory friendship with the aggressor state and discarding as of no value the friendship of a still unconquered nation whose help in the long run might be of infinite value. There is a strong bond of sympathy between the vast Congress Party of India, whose offer to help Britain on terms of freedom for India was refused early in the war, and the struggling millions of China, who have endured continuous Axis bombing for two and a half years. Both these allies were rebuffed. Both have now

been irreparably alienated. The great moral asset which brought Mr. Churchill into power, the belief that Britain was standing for freedom and no longer searching for short-term bargains with the Axis powers, was once again sacrificed. By yielding to Japan's demand to close the Burma Road for three months, Britain gained perhaps a short respite. If so, that was all, for Japanese militarists pursued their course, as if no friendly gesture had come from England. In all this sorry story of the Far East the United States must share the responsibility. America has always been in a stronger position than Britain to aid China and check Japan, if only because American trade with Japan and American supplies of war materials to Japan have always been so much larger than Britain's.

In this story we may find summarized all the factors of failure which I am analysing. There is a routine courtesy of British officials, whose main idea is to play for time and to persuade the Japanese to settle reasonably a problem which they intended to settle by force and in their own way. There is the natural tendency of the Foreign Office to expect to make a bargain with the more powerful party to the dispute and to treat the less developed and less armed power rather as a colony than as a friend. In this it is supported by the laudable dislike in all parts of the British community of quarrelling with anyone and, in particular, of running risks which might eventually lead to war. This policy of conciliation is, however, thwarted by the equal determination of propertied interests not to give up their own possessions, whatever Danegeld has to

be paid in Chinese currency. Above all, there is a total lack of imagination and understanding of the aspirations of those who wished to put diplomacy on a new basis, to collaborate with the forces of peace in checking aggression, and to seek a settlement of the world's problems by a policy based on the determination to spread to common people the advantages now belonging to a few. Any such policy stank of Bolshevism in the noses of the diplomats, who instinctively sided with a capitalist nation like Japan—which was an enemy of Russia—and against China, which tended, even against the will of its Government, increasingly to rely on Soviet help. Taken together these factors spelt inevitable failure both for the purposes of empire and for the purposes of preventing war. The opponents of Britain were ruthless men, unchecked by any democratic safeguards and determined at all costs to have their way. They had no intention of bargaining; they sought to substitute their new dominion for that of the old empires. In the end, let it be noted, Britain was driven, not to a dignified withdrawal on the ground that withdrawal is better than war—that would be decent and honourable—but to an ignominious surrender first of its friends and then of its own interests.

The Case of Italy

Let me illustrate this by another example. Take the case of Italy. Ever since Mussolini assumed power in Italy, influential people in Britain had respected Fascism. How many of the visitors who went to Florence and Rome cared about the murder of Matteotti, the

suppression of the trade unions, the suppression of the intellectual class by bludgeon and castor oil, the confinement of progressive and cultured people to the "Islands," and the drilling of the children of Italy into a belief that war and conquest were the noblest ends of man? All these things passed them by; they came home to tell that Italy was more efficient, that the trains ran on time, and that the Italian leisured class was charming to meet. Italy, like Japan, had been an ally in the last war; the object of diplomacy was to make her once again an ally or, better still, to join an alliance with Germany and Italy which would divert Hitler's ambitions to eastern Europe. Thus, once again, when the Abyssinian conflict arose and the force of public opinion induced the Government to range itself for a moment at the head of the forces supporting the League, all the Foreign Office influences, in both France and England, were set on accommodation with Italy at all costs. While the public was led to believe that Britain was going to lead the League powers in the stand against Italian aggression, diplomacy was in fact playing quite a different game behind the scenes. For nine months Mussolini openly prepared his attack on Abyssinia; and in the middle of that period Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and Sir John Simon went on a mission to Italy and took an Abyssinian expert with them. They found the Duce ready to join in a protest with them against Hitler's denunciation of the military clauses of the Versailles Treaty, and rather than risk offending Mussolini they came home without saying a word about Abyssinia. Then, in September 1935,

came Sir Samuel Hoare's speech at Geneva and the rally of world opinion behind what seemed at last to be a British lead. It was a great moment. Instead of Sir John Simon washing his hands with invisible soap while he explained just why the League Covenant did not oblige Britain to do what everyone knew it was obliged to do, we had an apparently honest and straightforward statement of British determination to stand against aggression. It was a great moment, followed, as we all remember, by a terrible collapse. It would take too long here to discuss how far Sir Samuel Hoare meant what he said to the League Assembly on September 9, how far the trickery of M. Laval was really to blame, whether Mr. Baldwin did or did not behave meanly in dismissing Sir Samuel Hoare as a scapegoat instead of shouldering his share of the blame, and whether, after the moral collapse of the attempted Laval-Hoare bargain, sanctions could have been pushed through to a successful conclusion. All I am concerned to point out is that once again there were two policies: on the one side a traditional Foreign Office policy, which took it for granted that you must be able to come to terms with another capitalist power and which was extremely open to the pressure of big business and the intervention of all sorts of titled and important people—and on the other a quite different policy, publicly pursued in deference to that mass of opinion which really hated Fascism, really wanted to stop aggression before the only way of stopping it was a ghastly world war, and was ready to ally itself with the forces of progress against those of reaction all over the world.

Throughout the whole story we may trace the influence of Catholicism at the Foreign Office. To very influential persons Rome stands for the centre of religious authority. They belong to another international—Catholic Christendom—and the fact that the Papacy was now under Fascist influence was to them scarcely relevant.

The Spanish War

The case of Spain is the most remarkable of all. Here there was no doubt about the legal rights and wrongs; and in France, the power most nearly concerned, there was a Popular Front Government which had everything to lose by a Fascist victory in Spain, but which was too torn by fear of war and of the Right in France ever to make a definite and honest decision. The mass of public sentiment was on the side of the Spanish Republic in both France and Spain. Against that popular sentiment were ranged Catholic opinion and Fascist opinion and those aristocratic and respectable elements which were terrified, above all, of Bolshevism. The Non-Intervention Committee, on which all the principal powers sat, is the most tragic and farcical example of the futility of old-fashioned diplomacy in face of totalitarian ambitions. There was no serious risk of general war over Spain, since Germany was not ready for war, and Spain not an immediate object of Hitler's ambition. In that astonishing Committee, ostensibly set up to keep the ring in Spain, Germany and Italy did exactly what they wanted. They were pouring materials of war and large numbers of troops into Spain

to help General Franco, with whose rising they had been concerned from the first. They were determined to have a Fascist Spain as a strategical base against France and Britain in the war that they were planning. They organized the whole rebellion on a staff basis and used the Committee as a way of cajoling and fooling the democratic elements which still played their part in British and French diplomacy. On the other side the Soviet Ambassador, whose country was helping the Spaniards, stood his ground and tried his best to find support in the vacillating counsels of Britain and France. Once again, the democratic representatives tried to use the committee technique to counter the staff work of the Fascist powers. But even those diplomats who sympathized with a Fascist rising to destroy a Left Government were also well aware of the dangers to British interests involved in a Fascist Spain. Once again, they saw Spain as a "problem" demanding a "solution." Could they arrange to have a Spain at the end of the war that would be friendly to Britain? They deluded themselves into thinking, as British statesmen said, that a power that refused to supply the munitions of war to *either* side would be popular with both when the war was over. They knew that all the arms that Franco wanted were pouring in from his Fascist allies; and that non-intervention meant that the Fascist side was armed, while the Republican side could receive only such material as slipped through from Russia or was supplied by private efforts from other neutral sources. Yet the power was in their hands. At any moment French armed intervention could have

ended the rebellion, or, if the formality of non-intervention had to be maintained, the British and French navies could have prevented any outside help from reaching either side. That, clearly, was to their interest; it was certainly to the interest of the democratic cause they were pledged to uphold. By habit, by class sympathy, by fear of Bolshevism, and by failure to grasp the significance of the totalitarian attack they played throughout the Fascist game. They could not see that there was no *solution* to this problem; that it was not an objective problem to be discussed and reasonably settled between themselves, Germany, Italy, and Russia, but a stage in a totalitarian war which was being waged against the popular forces everywhere in the world. And the result? Germany used Spain as practice ground for her bombers and she won two precious years for rearmament. She obtained a Government in Spain subservient to her ambitions. She won, as Hitler told us she wished to win, control of the rich iron ore of the Basque country; she left technicians and Nazi agents in key positions all over Spain; she established aerodromes and harbours which could be used in the future war against France and Britain. The Italian advantages were similar—a strengthened hold in the western Mediterranean and the destruction of popular forces which her own troops alone showed themselves incapable of defeating. When the war finally came to Europe, Franco ruled over a ruined country of which he was in reality no more than a puppet governor; the threat across the Pyrenees was one of the decisive factors in defeating France, and

the route to Germany through Spain lay open as a way of sending supplies to Germany. Finally Sir Samuel Hoare is dispatched to Madrid in the desperate hope of preserving General Franco's friendly neutrality. Late in the day it is realized that lubricants, maize, and other products that Germany needs have been entering Spain as once they entered Italy. The welcome news now comes that the United States is cutting off these supplies. But the latest stage of this unhappy story once again goes to discredit Mr. Churchill's eloquent phrases about so fighting the war that every British victory is recognized as a stage in the liberation of the European peoples. The brave band of anti-Fascist Italians in France and Britain were not used to help in the war of liberation; those in France have been passed over, bound hand and foot, to their Fascist enemies. The anti-Nazi refugees who would willingly have fought against Hitler were left in camps and handed over to Hitler's legions. The Spanish Republican army which had retreated across the Pyrenees was interned in foul camps in southern France; many who still remained in those camps have now presumably been passed over to the mercies of Mussolini or Franco. These were some of the forces of liberation that stood on the side of Britain. The British could not recognize them as such and they are betrayed and lost.

Mr. Chamberlain Takes a Hand

It would be unfair to suggest that all the tragedies of British diplomacy were due to this Foreign Office respectability, fear of Bolshevism, and assumption that

solutions satisfactory to British interests could always be reached with the Fascist powers. The confusions of French politics; the natural reluctance of the mass of people in the democratic countries to run risks of war; the singularly feeble statesmen thrown up in Britain and France in the last twenty years; the bad conscience left after Versailles; the genius of Hitler—a whole host of other factors help to explain why the Fascist drive for world conquest was not checked before it was strong enough to plunge the world into war. But I have said enough to show that as a machine to meet totalitarian diplomacy, which is inseparable from totalitarian war, the Foreign Office was utterly incompetent. At every stage it sought to placate enemies at the expense of potential friends. Even when the public was outraged by the Nazi persecution of the Jews and outlawry of all that was best and most progressive in Germany, the significance of the Nazi attack was lost on British authorities. They could be humanitarian, they could protest and offer help to individual refugees. Never for a moment could they see these refugees as allies in the struggle against totalitarianism. That was because they defended an out-of-date social structure and a set of ideals that had not been revised for centuries. It was no doubt shocking to them that Hitler proclaimed an ungentlemanly faith in the ancient Nordic gods and that his racial fanaticism spewed on Christianity as well as on reason and liberty. Brought up in the tradition of insular security, they assumed that this was one more phase of European politics which would pass leaving them se-

cure and free. They continued their exclusive game of diplomatic notes and face-saving formulas, just as the elaborately organized diplomatic corps of the eighteenth century had continued its routine of polite intrigue until with a single hammer-blow Frederick the Great smashed up the European system by marching his troops into Silesia. The parallel is close, save that modern methods of warfare enable Hitler to destroy not merely one but half a dozen countries in a few months. The democracies, it has been well said, still take their week-ends in the country, while the dictators take their countries in the week-end.

Democratic diplomats only began to awake when Hitler's aeroplanes and tanks swept over Austria in March 1938. Mr. Chamberlain saw that the routine of diplomacy would not then save the world from catastrophe, and I should not say that he was wrong in attempting to prevent war by brushing aside the usual Foreign Office advisers and attempting to save Europe by personal intervention. Unfortunately he took in their stead an adviser who knew as little of foreign politics as he did himself and understood totalitarian diplomacy even less than the Foreign Office. We shall understand Mr. Chamberlain aright if we think of him as a business-man converted twenty-five years too late to the doctrine preached by Norman Angell before the last war. He saw that war no longer paid, that it would be the ruin of business everywhere; and he assumed that this simple truth would influence Hitler if he passed over the east of Europe as Germany's economic *Lebens-*

raum. But whatever else Hitler is, he is not an economic man.

Some of Mr. Chamberlain's associates were followers of Dr. Buchman, who thanked God for Hitler as a saviour from Bolshevism and who holds that peace may come through the collaboration of God-guided heads of states. It was perhaps in that spirit that Mr. Chamberlain approached Hitler, received his pledge, and came back from Munich proclaiming peace in our time. Unfortunately Hitler's gods were not Mr. Chamberlain's, and when Hitler broke his promise to consult Britain before making any further advance, Mr. Chamberlain was outraged and gave a guarantee to Poland, which was meaningless without a Russian alliance. This ensured that Britain would fight the war with the minimum of allies and at the moment Hitler chose. For this the Foreign Office was not to blame. Certainly it chafed under two years of Mr. Chamberlain's diplomacy, but its habits and routine were strong, and in all its dealings with Russia, so vital to security in those last months, it could not once take a step which showed imagination and the promise of a different outlook. Stalin's offer of a conference at Bucharest after Hitler's occupation of Prague was refused; if after that Stalin still had hopes of collaboration with Britain he must soon have abandoned them. When at length a British mission went to Russia, it was headed by no leading statesman to soothe Stalin's *amour propre*; the Germans knew better when they sent Herr von Ribbentrop. The negotiations were unreal, for, after the experience of

Munich, which was an invitation to Germany to attack Russia instead of the west, Stalin sought to return the compliment by an agreement with Germany which left Russia immune and Hitler a free hand to strike at Britain and France. The dismissal of M. Litvinov and the speeches of M. Molotov should have given Britain warning of the coming change in Russian diplomacy, but even then the military and political representatives of Britain were given no powers such as could have reassured Stalin, nor were they of a calibre to make him believe in the reality of the transformation of British policy.

What Must be Done

I have said enough to explain why the Foreign Office as now constituted cannot conduct the diplomacy of the war of liberation, of which Mr. Churchill speaks. It still considers diplomacy as something apart from strategy; it cannot conceive that allies may be dispossessed peoples without states, or that war aims which promise liberation may be fundamental to the task of winning the war. War aims are just part of propaganda as they were in the last war, fine things you say to please your own public and to deceive the enemy, while the army, navy and air force does the real fighting. If European revolution is Britain's war strategy, as it must be to counter Hitler's dynamic, then British foreign policy must be brought into line with this strategy. This implies a revolution in British methods of diplomacy as well as in British propaganda. It means that Britain must snatch from Hitler the propaganda

weapon which he uses to undermine democracies; that Britain must recognize as enemies those who accept National Socialist doctrines, and recognize as friends every force which can be mobilized to weaken the Nazis.

When, nine months after the war had begun, a new British Prime Minister, with a sense of realities, decided to send to Russia an Ambassador with powers and a personality which Russia could respect, it was too late to achieve any swift reversal of Russian policy. But Stalin is well aware that a German Europe would be disastrous to the U.S.S.R. He fears that a Nazi victory in the west would be followed by an invasion of the Ukraine and perhaps by an effort to destroy the Soviet Union by the joint forces of Germany and Japan. Distrust of the British Government and knowledge of Hitler's power together explain why Stalin found it necessary to make his pact with Germany in the summer of 1939, and why, after the war had begun, he went to war with Finland and moved so rapidly to revise the frontiers of Brest-Litovsk.

Fear of Germany, which now has a million and a half men mobilized on the frontiers of the Soviet Union, explains why, after twice hesitating, Molotov eventually paid a visit to Berlin. But the Russians are past masters in the art of procrastination and it is by no means clear that the grandiose schemes that Dr. Goebbels suggested would follow from this visit are any nearer fulfilment. The U.S.S.R. probably agreed to some further measure of economic co-operation; Stalin may have been tempted by offers of a free hand in Iran and have

agreed to Hitler's next steps in the Balkans. But the neutrality of the Russian press is maintained; lately it has emphasized British success in the air. Some time the U.S.S.R. may feel in a position to give more explicit signs of its independence of Germany. In these days it is often difficult to distinguish between fear and friendship. The U.S.S.R. is certainly the greatest of the powers which have found it expedient to adopt a policy agreeable to Hitler; since it is the greatest, it may also be the first to be in a position to reverse that policy. If so, it will be because Germany no longer looks like winning the war and because the Government in power in Britain has shown a real desire to co-operate with the U.S.S.R. and a real understanding of the great part that Russia must play in the future. For that reason all the arguing about the gold and the ships of the Baltic states occupied by Russia and the protest about the U.S.S.R.'s participation in the Danubian conference at Germany's request were unnecessary and futile. Legalities of this kind have become absurd and Britain's offer of *de facto* recognition of Russia's acquisitions in the Baltic could have little appeal. Stalin knew well enough that he was in *de facto* control; he could only be interested in a declaration that assured him that Britain accepted his new position as permanent and unchallengeable. The Soviet threat to German control of the Balkans should be welcomed by a realistic Foreign Office. Everything should be done to encourage the closest relationship with the Soviet Union. We in Britain are no longer able to afford sentimentality. The worship of Stalin by orthodox Communists constitutes no menace; the senti-

mental hatred of Bolshevism, still powerful among our rulers, may yet be one of the greatest obstacles we have to overcome.

How far Stalin now favours revolutionary change in Europe is a matter for speculation. We can only be sure that he will be deeply concerned with the Slav states of eastern Europe and with any territory which affects the strategic security of the U.S.S.R. As for a revolution, which in the west must be inspired to a large extent by the democratic traditions of western Europe, there is little doubt that it will be viewed by Stalin with the greatest suspicion, either as the sentimental vapourings of Utopian idealists or as a smoke screen for British imperialism. It is Britain's business to see to it that it is in fact neither of these things; and this is one of the cases in which suspicion will be allayed and perhaps friendship won by success—and only by success. If there is a revolution in western Europe and Germany, Stalin will be forced to utilize the opportunity on Germany's eastern frontiers, and we shall be well advised to remember the lesson of the Russian Communists in western Europe. The movements which can be inspired in the west will have as little appeal to the peasant peoples of the Balkans as Russian Communism has had for the peoples of the west. If this lesson can be learned, a *modus vivendi* may be found.

Some may imagine that the policy of European liberation will shock the conservative instincts of American business-men and make it more difficult to obtain the assistance of the United States, which is essential. Such an argument is based on a misunderstanding of

America. The American public was contemptuous of British weaknesses and of the tendency of British diplomacy to allow itself to be tricked by the Nazis. It admires activity, has always responded to every demonstration of British determination, and responds immediately to the cause of freedom. America is not afraid of European revolution; on the contrary, the prospect of an ordered and co-operative Europe, in the reconstruction of which America can assist, is above all likely to appeal to the America of the New Deal. Let us not forget that hatred of the Nazis and of Nazi methods is stronger in the United States even than in England. For the America which fears a "world policy" that might seem to involve American responsibility or to be a camouflage for a renewed British imperialism would find immediate arguments of humanity and business for supporting an active attempt to rebuild a sane and prosperous Europe. The United States is well aware that no co-operation is possible with a Nazi Europe, and that her own interests are vitally affected by Nazi ambitions in South America and by Nazi propaganda in North America; and the humanitarian instincts of the overwhelming majority of Americans are deeply moved by an appeal to save Europe from the poverty and starvation now threatening the countries from which the population of America ultimately comes. I suggest, when Hitler declares that the British blockade of Europe is responsible for hunger and misery in the countries he has conquered, that Britain ought to reply by a specific offer to pour food into all areas evacuated by German troops. The flag of liberation will fly above

that of the Union Jack, and that flag must bring not trade, but food to distressed peoples. I prophesy with complete assurance that at any point where it becomes possible, from a military point of view, to raise the blockade, America will co-operate to the full both in helping to bring to the victims of Nazi aggression the food they need and in so organizing the administration that the food feeds the hungry peoples who are liberated and is not seized by the Nazis for their own purposes. To offer to raise the blockade wherever free men can receive food may yet save Europe from the worst horrors of famine. It is also part of the strategy of revolution in Europe and part of the necessary reply to Hitler's propaganda today.

What practical steps must be taken to construct a Foreign Office capable of carrying out this revolutionary policy? First, it is clear that Lord Halifax is not the man for the job.¹ When Hitler told us that he has conquered Europe, and told the states he has conquered that the British blockade and British bombers alone stand between them and peace, Lord Halifax replied with a finely phrased reminder of the accepted doctrines of the Christian religion. Nobody doubts the nobility or high-mindedness of this aristocrat who is so wrongly described by Hitler as a pluto-democrat. His roots go back to a feudal world that precedes the industrial age. But today we must have a Foreign Minister who understands the realities of this totalitarian age.

¹ Since this book was written Lord Halifax was appointed Ambassador to the United States and was succeeded at the Foreign Office by Mr. Anthony Eden.

If we find such a minister, he will have to reconstruct the Foreign Office from top to bottom. Perhaps he may think it wise to take a leaf out of Hitler's book and leave some of the present routineers in Whitehall to carry on, not incompetently, the day-by-day work of official diplomacy. Whether they remain or no, he must find a staff of quite different calibre: of men who intend to utilize the forces of revolution in Europe, who are acquainted less with embassies and diplomatic drawing-rooms and more with underground movements, resurgent forces, and revolutionary ambitions. Certainly he will have to work both privately and publicly with those who are organizing the European revolution, and above all with those who are doing its propaganda. Unless British actions can reinforce and give reality to Mr. Churchill's promises, it may soon be too late to convince the countries Hitler has conquered that we really mean a liberation when we say it; it may be too late to convince the United States that we are thinking in other terms than those of empire; too late to convince the U.S.S.R. that we are not attempting to come to terms with other Christian and Fascist powers in order to make a joint war against Soviet Russia; too late to convince the Indian masses (who are not Christian) that any promise we make can be sincere; too late to convince the hundred million allies who would spring to Britain's help all over Europe that Britain possesses any dynamic, any concept of a new order capable of taking the place of Hitler's plan for a new slave world.



CHAPTER III

PROPAGANDA

Goebbels and Hitler

I HAVE said enough to show why British foreign policy could not succeed in meeting the totalitarian challenge. It was dilettante and amateurish in comparison with the new professional standard set up by the Nazis. But the fundamental reason for its failure was that it had no clear or positive objective. Its objects were to hold on to what Britain possessed, to maintain an outworn *status quo*, if possible without war. This left the field wide open for Nazi propaganda. The mass of mankind, not only in Germany, but everywhere, was discontented with the *status quo*; it was therefore comparatively easy for Dr. Goebbels to exploit all the different discontents in order to disintegrate the capitalist world of sovereign states. This process had been going on for years before the war actually began; Ger-

man minorities in a score of countries were organized, partly by genuine persuasion and partly by blackmail, into becoming Fifth Columnists. Dispossessed minorities were promised help against their oppressors; capitalists were promised increased security against Bolshevism; Trotskyites and other Left groups were promised the abolition of capitalism, which Social Democrats had failed to destroy; Arab nationalists were promised independence and freedom from the exploitation of foreign imperialism; even the "sub-human" blacks and the discontented masses of India were told that Hitler would bring them freedom. Most important of all was the general propaganda against the world dictatorship of international finance, which was represented as wholly Jewish. This was the best cry of all, for it segregated as the enemy of society a small group of rich men whom large numbers of persons in every country and of every class already regarded with fear and hatred. Against this well-conceived propaganda campaign the democracies had no satisfactory counter.

Dr. Goebbels is rightly known as the world's greatest liar. He invents facts or twists them with no thought in mind but their immediate efficacy in influencing some group to whom he is speaking. He pursued in the international field exactly the policy which Hitler had used so successfully in winning power in Germany. It was one of the Nazis' most surprising discoveries that you could successfully pursue contradictory lines of propaganda at the same time. You could persuade the slum-dwellers that you were attacking international finance and big business, and the wealthy that

you were saving them from Marxism. You could even induce wealthy Jews to give you money in the hope of buying security for themselves and to aid them in keeping the world safe for big business. Lies and contradictions do not damage propaganda value? No, on one condition—that the general trend of propaganda has in it enough substantial truth to convince those to whom it is addressed. For propaganda is the art of persuasion, and we are all ready enough to be persuaded of things we want to believe. If the propagandist exaggerates or lies about details, few people object provided they are given reasons for believing what it suits them to believe. That is exactly what Goebbels has done, not only for the mass of Germans, but for innumerable dissatisfied groups all over the world.

When the war began in September 1939, Goebbels had had six years to unite Germany in its belief in the Führer and to build up pro-Nazi sympathy in every foreign country. That had been his first task. At the same time he had built up the Hitler *mystique*, the belief not only in the power but in the infallibility of the Führer; and in creating this myth of the irresistible power of the Nazis he had also created fear. The most brilliant passages in *Mein Kampf* are devoted to an analysis of propaganda as a means of destroying your enemy. Hitler points out that the social democracy which he was determined to overthrow, first in Germany and then abroad, was controlled by politicians who were concerned with their personal position and whose lives were bounded by the petty game of party politics, in which the first concern was always to gain

as many votes as possible. He expresses surprise that this parliamentary system had so stubbornly held, but he is able to find in it two great weaknesses. The first is the cowardice of many politicians and trade-union leaders when they are physically in danger. The Nazis have always realized that civilized people will run the risk of death, but cannot endure a life of terror. The threat of torture, the fear of being beaten up in the street, the ultimate horror of the concentration camps are the most effective weapon against those enemies who cannot be won over by propaganda. Secondly, Hitler sees that these politicians and trade-union leaders are often the servants of a party machine which keeps them in comfort and which isolates them from the rank and file of their followers. In a memorable passage he points out that vote-catching is not the same thing as leadership; common men and women who vote for political leaders have no fundamental trust in them and do not believe that the promises made on the platform will be made good if the effort to fulfil them means personal risk to the politicians who give them. He contrasts such political leadership with that of the soldier who must die with his comrades once the order to advance has been given. He declares that it is the first attribute of the genuine leader to think out a line of action to which he will adhere whatever befalls. And he comments on the serious effect upon the prestige of a leader if he advocates a line of policy from which he must later retreat. It is a sober fact that the program which he lays down for himself in *Mein Kampf* has guided his action ever since, and that although he has

deceived his people when he offered them peace and a better standard of living, he has fulfilled his main promise of raising Germany from its semi-colonial position after the last war and of trampling on the democracies which had triumphed over it in 1918. One of the strongest proofs of Hitler's insight was his realization that to publish what seemed a wildly improbable program was not, as the world expected, to render it impossible, but to lay the seeds of future success. When Hitler wrote *Mein Kampf* his dream seemed utterly absurd; the forces against him in Germany and outside appeared to be so overwhelming that he was written off as a madman. Mad we may hold him to be in the fundamental sense that his values are distorted, that he was sincere in saying that war is good and peace is bad, that he cares nothing for human happiness, and desires power for its own sake. Hitler is a paranoiac. That is to say, he belongs to that not inconsiderable class of persons in whom persecution or the belief in persecution has bred hatred and led to the construction in their own minds of a dream-world in which it is in their power to subjugate all their enemies, real or imagined, to their own will. One may meet such people boasting to be Napoleon or Julius Cæsar in any lunatic asylum. Occasionally in history we meet with paranoiacs who have the capacity to infect those around them with their own mania, to make them dream their dreams and induce them to follow blindly. Such dreamers usually believe that they hear voices, that they are guided by Providence and are the instruments of a higher purpose. There have been great conquerors

of this type. Joan of Arc is one of the most obvious examples. Such dreamers pursue their dream with great skill and determination; they continue to dream in defeat or exile. The dream is only abandoned with life itself.

Here is the origin of the Hitler *mystique*. Its core is the Führer's own will; its successful dissemination depended on the success of the early part of Hitler's program. If Hitler had been checked in 1933 or 1934, he could never again have re-established popular belief in his infallibility. But one success followed another, and as time went on, the task of Dr. Goebbels became increasingly easy. More people believed in Hitler; more people feared the Nazis. And when we consider the humble origins of the Hitler movement and the almost hopeless task that Hitler seemed to have set himself, it is small wonder that he has fanatics around him, and that it was possible during six years of power to terrorize and overwhelm the older generation in Germany, and by deliberate education in Führer-worship to bring up in blind obedience a younger generation who have had, be it noted, no alternative philosophy presented to it.

Lessons from Mein Kampf

Before proceeding to consider methods of countering Nazi propaganda let us learn from *Mein Kampf* some lessons laid down for us by the greatest master of the art. First Hitler knows that the spoken word may be more powerful than the written. German journalists were his worst enemies, and there is today no group of

persons so detestable to Hitler as the journalistic profession. Notice that Hitler and Goebbels use words as weapons, whereas democrats use them as argument. Read a democratic newspaper or hear a democratic speech and you are left with some material for thought. The thought may not be on a high level, the speech may have been tub-thumping, but the effect on the audience is to set them arguing, criticizing, discussing the merits of what was said. After a political meeting in a democracy you will hear the audience remarking that such and such was a good point, so and so a good or bad speaker. After a Nazi meeting you will find only two reactions: some will leave in a state of terror, the majority hysterically roused and ready to act at the bidding of the speaker. Words are weapons. What a relief, in the bewildered misery of post-war Germany, to turn from a meeting where the situation was carefully analysed, the difficulties explained, and election pledges given, to one where a fanatical speaker, imbued, apparently, with absolute confidence in himself and his party, followed Hitler's precept of never arguing or discussing; who laid down at the beginning of his speech a simple proposition which was supposed to solve all problems, who then repeated it with variations, and concluded with a terrific peroration assigning his enemies to an early perdition and outlining a short program of direct action in which you could all take part! What a relief to people who were used to argument about the class struggle and surplus value suddenly to be told that all their troubles were due to the Jews, and that all would be well when they had

burned down Ikey Mo's shop! There is a story of Hitler, in the days before he had won power, building up with hoarse eloquence the picture of German misery and attributing the war, the humiliation of defeat, the unemployed, and the inflation all to the Jews. Somewhere from the back of the hall a man called out: "That's right, it's all the Jews and cyclists." Hitler: "Why the cyclists?" The voice: "Why the Jews?" But that must have been before the S.A. who surrounded Hitler seized any interrupter and beat him senseless as they threw him from the building. The recipe for a successful Nazi meeting is simple—the maximum hatred, a single, simple idea leading to direct action, and no discussion.

This brings me to a second point upon which Hitler lays great stress. He describes how at the end of the last war the morale of the troops was undermined by letters from their wives describing their hunger and misery. (He has seen to it, by the way, in this war that every German soldier should be assured of full state provision for his dependants. The advance of the German troops is not to be impeded by fear of what is happening at home. No German soldier is allowed "to look back.") If only some propagandist had been in charge of Germany in 1918—Hitler is clearly thinking of himself—all this rot could have been stopped. The German army, he says, was not defeated. Germany was betrayed from within by financiers, Jews, parliamentarians, and newspapers. That is Hitler's famous theory of the "stab in the back"—the stab which he arranged recently in the back of the Dutch, the

Belgians, and the French. The facts about Germany in 1918 do not worry Hitler. Actually the German army was defeated on the field, and the revolution only took place when General Ludendorff, Hitler's patron and friend, sent an emissary to Berlin to arrange for a meeting of the parliamentary leaders at which they could be informed that it was useless to sacrifice more German blood, and that peace must be made at once. It was only after the news seeped through Germany that the Commander-in-Chief had given up the struggle that general revolution broke out in Germany. The story of the stab in the back is a lie. But in *Mein Kampf* Hitler declares that no one in any circumstances should ever be allowed in Germany to think that the army was defeated. To allow the question of who was to blame for the defeat even to be discussed was to encourage that "objectivity" which he notes as a dangerous characteristic of the German people. Here is one of the great rules of Nazi propaganda: permit no objective discussion because that introduces an element of doubt; to win and maintain power you must never allow any opinion antipathetic to your own to be expressed. The people must follow you blindly. The ordinary human animal must obey, not think; he can never in any case be more than a mere cog in the vast state machine. You can direct his attention to one enemy at a time: Jews, Communists, financiers, priests, pastors, liberals, pacifists, intellectuals, and then abroad, Czechs, Poles, French, British, and so forth. For this program you must burn or ban all books that might say a good word for any of these groups, and see that

all newspapers and every radio talk and every platform speech adheres to the same doctrine, and that for those who grow tired of propaganda there is relaxation in magnificently displayed public demonstrations and in ample amusements suitable for the mass intelligence. Once the stage has been reached in which the conquering nation is isolated from the world, in which foreign newspapers cannot permeate and foreign radio may not be heard, there will be no danger that any doctrine put forward will be disputed. Some tough souls may still disbelieve it, but that will no longer matter. In a famous passage Hitler declares that lies are necessary to lead the people, and the greater the lie, the more certainly will the bourgeoisie be taken in, since they are accustomed to telling small lies and seeing through them, but they are incapable of imagining the impudence necessary to turn the truth on its head. That maxim served Hitler well while there was still a bourgeoisie with ideas of its own that needed to be bamboozled.

Ministry of Information and B.B.C.

I have painted a gruesome but not, I think, an exaggerated picture of the Nazi technique of propaganda. If we do not understand its methods and its power, we shall go on repeating blunders which we cannot afford. The British have been accustomed to boast of their capacity to muddle through, to lose all the battles except the last, which merely meant that because Britain was an island with more money and a bigger navy than other people, they could afford mistakes and still have

time for recovery. Muddling through is not a sign of genius. Eight years of Hitler's success, and the spectacle of six countries occupied or overrun in a few weeks and of Europe controlled by Hitler, should surely be enough to sober us down into a realization that it is not enough merely to say that the British are boys of the bulldog breed with an invincible navy and all the rest of it. Mr. Churchill, romantically British as he is, realizes that, when he talks about a war of liberation for Europe. But we need much more evidence than we have at present that Mr. Churchill, or anyone else in the Government, has soberly considered the part which propaganda must play in Britain and abroad if Europe is to be liberated before the hold of the Nazi machine has substituted apathy for anger.

In Mr. Churchill himself the nation has found a magnificent propagandist. His confident courage, his superb knack of finding the phrase that sticks, and his natural buoyancy are remarkably effective in maintaining unity in his country. They are precisely adapted for a moment when nationalism is at its height because invasion seems imminent. They are effective in the Empire and in the United States, where Mr. Churchill's language is understood and where it carries conviction. Britain seems at last to have a Government that means what it says and has courage and leadership at the top. One or two other British speakers have been found to keep the country in good heart in a crisis. Mr. Bevin has proved effective, and Mr. J. B. Priestley has recalled to complicated and hesitant minds the simple truth that, whatever their politics and their differences and

their international aspirations, the British are, in the last resort, a people with a way of living that they cherish and a freedom that would die with Hitler's victory. But this is not enough. How inadequate it is, the story of Mr. Duff Cooper's broadcasts effectively illustrates. Newly appointed as Minister of Information, Mr. Duff Cooper, a lover of France as well as of England, pleased a large majority of the public with talks whose appeal was much the same as Mr. Priestley's. Unfortunately Mr. Duff Cooper became more and more literary. He talked about the Armada and Napoleon's attempts at invasion a century and a quarter ago, and he allowed himself the luxury of reading long patriotic poems, forgetful that to a large part of the population all this seemed irrelevant rodomontade; that when he spoke of the feeling about the soil of England, not many people were conscious of owning any soil; that to the unemployed and the slum-dweller in many big cities these things are utterly remote; that to the class-conscious worker they sound like a rather thinly disguised effort to persuade working people that their interests are those of the rich. In these days the army and navy are far more educated and politically conscious than they were before. I know of one instance in which officers and men listened with sober interest to the informative first part of a speech by the Minister of Information and then burst into roars of laughter when he began to talk in high-flown language and to recite passages from the patriotic classics.

Even propaganda of this kind was lacking in the early days of the war. All Britons knew that war was

unutterably loathsome; they had all entered upon it with infinite reluctance, but they did not wish for a Prime Minister regularly to address them in the tones of an undertaker; and the Ministry of Information, set up when war began, failed to do anything positive at all. As an organization it was ludicrously inefficient. Its 999 members became a stock joke in the press. Journalists complained that the service censorship was merely silly; stories that were already released in the world's press and well known in Germany were held up at the critical moment or torn out of the papers after they were already in type, only to be released again when the issue was already printed. The Ministry was organized like any other civil-service department; there were an unnecessary number of bottle-necks in which every suggestion stuck on its way to the top; incompetent people were placed in positions of authority; people who were competent in industry dealt with films, and those who knew nothing about broadcasting were appointed and failed to co-operate with the B.B.C. The younger and more energetic members of the staff who had entered the Ministry with high hopes of doing a good job found themselves thwarted at every turn; "hot" pamphlets written to meet an urgent situation had to be submitted to a whole hierarchy of officials who went through them as if they were memoranda for submission to the Cabinet; everyone wrote memoranda to everyone else; no one took responsibility; the younger and abler people resigned; there was no machinery for assessing public opinion and no policy for sustaining morale. The Ministry of

Information became a laughing-stock, under a gentlemanly and cautious judge who had no conception of what propaganda meant. His successor, Sir John Reith, made some administrative improvements, but he, too, failed to make the cumbrous machinery work. With the arrival of the Churchill Government and the appointment of Mr. Duff Cooper as Minister of Information, some minor improvements were made. But the Ministry today is still totally inadequate to this task.

This is, of course, partly due to the Government's failure to put forward a clearly conceived war aim which would shape the program of British propaganda. But there are other defects almost as important in the actual machinery of the propaganda departments. Today, even if the Government did by some miracle suddenly and completely grasp the strategy of European revolution and see clearly the new European order which it wished to build, British propaganda departments would, by their very structure, prevent any clear idea of the Government's view from percolating outside Whitehall. Let us see quite briefly what these defects are. The first is so glaring that it is difficult to understand how, after nearly a year of war, the Prime Minister has still made no effort to tackle it. There is no central planning body which decides upon the general lines of British propaganda policy and directs all the various departments to follow this general line. On any newspaper the editor has a daily conference in which the general line of the paper is discussed and agreed upon. In that conference the editor speaks with colleagues, each of whom is personally charged

with responsibility for a certain section of the paper; and, since things often happen after the conference has met, the form of the paper does not remain rigid as day turns into night, but is constantly modified to meet the changing new situation. Those modifications are introduced, very largely, by the night editor. He knows the paper's general line, and he must very often, upon his own sole responsibility, make decisions of the greatest importance. If they meet with approval, he is praised; if they are condemned, he may well get the sack.

Thus the secret of good editing is a clear general line given from the man in command and great devolution of responsibility in the carrying out of that line. The British propaganda departments fail in both these respects. Consider, for instance, British European broadcasts. As far as I know, there is no daily meeting of the men in charge of the various branches of European propaganda at which they receive their daily directions from the Minister of Information. Responsibility is divided between the staff of foreign experts in the Ministry and the staff of news and talks editors in the B.B.C. The former are paid to ensure that the news and talks sent out by the latter are good propaganda. Thus, instead of a daily editorial meeting between the Minister and his propaganda chiefs, you have the daily supervision by a host of foreign experts in the ministry of the broadcast newspaper which the journalists are turning out in the B.B.C. And the foreign news bulletins and talks, for that reason, are like a newspaper which has been sedulously pruned and cen-

sored by expert advisers representing every interest mentioned in the news. In brief, the function of the Minister and his Ministry is not to turn out propaganda, but to ensure that the news and talks turned out by the B.B.C. in broadcasting abroad and the news and views turned out by the newspapers at home are innocuous.

There is, as we all know, nothing more deadly than a news story which offends no one. Is it not a remarkable fact that a large building in the centre of London is staffed by hundreds of civil servants, ambassadors, and other diplomats whose countries have been conquered, and innumerable experts, for the sole purpose of taking any sting which it may possess out of any news story which reaches Britain? The first reason why British propaganda has failed is that the Minister's function has been defined not as turning out positive fighting propaganda but as ensuring that whatever goes out cannot possibly do anyone any harm.

This brings me to the second defect, the servile subordination of the propaganda departments to the censorship of the service chiefs. It is, of course, perfectly reasonable that the navy, army, and air force should be able to prevent the publication of news or propaganda material which might disclose their plans to the enemy. What is not reasonable is that any and every demand of the service departments should be slavishly accepted by the Propaganda Department. For, important as the fighting forces are in this war, we have seen in the analysis of Hitler's secret weapon that without the preceding campaign of propaganda and revo-

lutionary activity no military campaign is likely to succeed. Thus, if the services are permitted to take it for granted that propaganda must always be subordinated to their lightest wishes, they will unconsciously be preventing the success of their own operations.

It was hoped that when Mr. Duff Cooper was given access to the War Cabinet this meant that propaganda would have a new status *vis-à-vis* the services. But this has not proved to be the case. Mr. Duff Cooper is a traditionalist, well trained in the rules of precedence, and he has entirely failed to establish the principle that in a conflict of interest between, shall we say, the Air Ministry and the Propaganda Departments, the interests of propaganda may often be as important as and actually prevail over those of strategy.

Hence the absurdities that sometimes amuse and annoy American correspondents in England. There is, for instance, a rule that the names of bombed towns shall not be given until individually released. There is a basis for this rule—that in some cases the Germans have been mistaken about the places their bombers have visited. But the rule-of-thumb refusal to allow the name to be cabled may produce the ridiculous result of compelling an American correspondent to delete the word "Coventry" while allowing him to refer to Lady Godiva and thus inform every American editor which town is involved. No great harm is done, because the Germans were obviously well aware that the town was Coventry—the censor released the word a few hours afterwards—and learned nothing when the American press inserted "Coventry" in place of the

periphrasis about a certain city "famous for its naked lady"!

Home Morale

Once British foreign propaganda has been improved, it would be easy to build a machine of propaganda; once that was clear, broadcasters, pamphleteers, journalists, and the rest would know what to say. For note that propaganda is really the same as advertising. An advertising agent who knows his job and who wishes to put across a soap or a cigarette or a brand of chocolates decides on a simple kind of appeal and then in posters, newspaper advertisements, and the rest rings the changes on that simple idea. He must have the idea clear first. People have an idea that there is something immoral about drinking beer. The advertiser meets this by innumerable devices all designed to show the would-be beer-drinker that in fact beer is beneficial to the health, that "Guinness is good for you," that the advertised beverage contains food value and will make you feel vigorous and fit. Does he wish to advertise cigarettes? The advertiser tells you that his brand is positively good for your throat, or he placards the country with pictures of immaculate butlers presenting cigarettes on a silver salver, or of lovely women accepting their favourite brand under a pink-shaded lamp or in a punt by moonlight. These are simple ways of overcoming inhibitions and of appealing to the unconscious knack of association that we all possess to reinforce a desire that is quite conscious. Advertisers boast that advertising must be truthful. That must be taken with

a grain of salt, but it embodies this truth: that you cannot sell chocolates or cigarettes or beer to people who don't like them, and that no amount of advertising will persuade you that the bad brands are better than the good provided that you have the chance of buying both. In the same way, given the general detestation of Fascism and determination to resist the Nazis, there should be no difficulty in giving people confidence, provided always that they can trust their leaders, understand what they are doing, and be allowed to participate freely and give their services with a feeling that they are wanted. Therefore the first necessity of any propaganda is a program of action which people understand, and an appeal (which can only succeed if it is genuine) to the mass of people to fight for those things about which they really care. No amount of propaganda will make people believe in fighting a war unless they are shown how they can win it; no eloquence or trickery will persuade people that they are fighting Fascism if Fascist methods are used to coerce them at home; no appeal to a romantic nationalism, however eloquent, will engender enthusiasm in a politically-conscious working class if it believes that some people are "doing well" out of the war, and that wealthy individuals and groups are able to hold up production for their private advantage and obtain privileges of comfort or security which are denied to the workaday mass.

The British have, thank God, no Führer, no Hitler *mystique*, no conquering ambition or love of war. Democracy, inefficient though it is, has the merit of

making them independent citizens, who like to believe that they judge issues for themselves and who are intensely suspicious of official propaganda. They have learned to hate the very word. Many people remember that they were persuaded in the last war of things which they now regret. They no longer easily believe in atrocities; they regret that they are themselves forced to actions that are loathsome by a power which is beyond scruple and humanity. But we all know that we cannot become fanatics on the Nazi model, and we do not wish to. To oppose Nazi fanaticism and cruelty, we have to remain free men and women, willingly accepting the dangers and relying on our natural courage to see us through a task we would gladly have evaded. Mr. Churchill understands this well; one of his greatest merits has been his determination to prepare the British for the worst, not to hide their danger or pretend that they have made no mistakes. He knows that they can bear the truth, provided that he can give them a rational case for believing that the effort and the sacrifice will not be in vain.

Britain began the war with one great disadvantage—that for six years Hitler's plans have been crowned with continuous success; but there was also an advantage—that the world had learned not to trust Hitler. The Ministry of Information began with at least one right idea: that the proper counter to Goebbels was to tell the truth. If the B.B.C. reports were reliable, then people in England and in many other countries would believe British reports and discount Fascist fairy tales. Unfortunately, the authorities seemed to deduce

that as long as they did not tell lies they could sit down and leave all the initiative to the enemy. But truth will not prevail just because it is the truth, and it will certainly not prevail if it is tinged with a rosy hue of optimism which is constantly discredited by events. The morale of the country will not be maintained merely by sitting still and comparing British virtues with Nazi vices. Hitler could be sure of confusion in France when he attacked, not merely because France's generals were bad, her armaments insufficient, and her fortifications far less strong than her people had been induced to imagine. He could be sure of success because for eight months everything had been done to undermine French morale. The Maginot Line had become a myth; all you had to do was to sit still and hope that the Germans would be rash enough to attack. Nothing was done to counteract defeatist talk and action in the civil service and the General Staff. Nothing was done to make common people feel that the war in which they were asked to give their lives was their war, and fought for their benefit. Instead of realizing that the large Communist Party represented a potentially very important working-class force in resistance to Hitler, and therefore finding out what was necessary to enlist its support, the authorities were content to throw dissident Communists into jail by the thousand. Instead of making use of the anti-Fascist Germans and Italians, they were caged behind barbed wire until Hitler arrived to fetch them. Meanwhile Fascist intrigue was allowed to flourish in high places. Here is the very recipe for disaster, and it is partly because the same

tendencies exist in Britain today that it is so urgent immediately to tackle the question of propaganda there in a new way and with a new spirit. If things are allowed to drift, the British, too, may become obsessed with the one question of resisting invasion, which Hitler, if he follows his usual plan, will postpone until he thinks he has undermined morale. The British, too, may allow all attention to be diverted to the defence forces and think that the best way of dealing with apathy, the natural pacifism of a bored people, and with defeatist propaganda is by means of a repression that will do more to undermine morale than the open enmity of any anti-war doctrine. All these dangers are very real. If the British allow the menace of Fascism to drive them to undemocratic methods, and if they do not base their home policy on an invigorating social creed which the masses will understand, they will ensure their own defeat. They will be morally defeated if they deal with refugees and with discontented workers by Fascist methods, and they may be actually defeated, too, in the war by adopting the negative side of Hitlerism without being able to produce among young people that positive will to victory which is Hitler's greatest asset. The result, if the British commit this last folly, will be to achieve the ignoble status of France—a Fascist regime without the energizing faith of the Nazis.

Propaganda Abroad

What then must be done? The British must imitate Hitler in two respects and in two respects only. They must co-ordinate their propaganda with foreign policy

and strategy. Secondly, they must plan with a view to strengthening their friends and finding the weak spots in the enemy.

Let me present in rough outline the machinery and the propaganda policies that are necessary for victory. First, the Government should give form and content to Mr. Churchill's remark about the liberation of Europe. Once the decision is taken that this must be a people's war at home and a revolutionary war abroad, the Minister of Information should set up a propaganda editorial executive to deal with propaganda just as there already is a General Staff to plan the activities of the fighting services. The executive should work, not as a Government department with all the routine of the civil service, but with the swiftness and discipline of a newspaper office.

There should be an editor-in-chief of European broadcasts with full power to plan broadcasting policy, under the directions of the Cabinet, and an editor-in-chief of printed propaganda—written articles to be placed in neutral papers, leaflets, or any other written material—and each of these men would have under him a whole series of small bureaux to deal with the separate peoples. The European editorial executive would confer daily with representatives of the service departments, of the Foreign Office, and of the Ministry of Economic Warfare acting in an advisory capacity. And each day, after its conference, its directive would be sent to each of the specialist bureaux. These bureaux would be staffed partly by Englishmen with political experience of the countries, partly by newspapermen,

and partly by nationals of the countries. The qualification for work in such a bureau is the ability not merely to understand the language but to think in terms of the social life of any particular country. Each bureau would be a genuine international team, working together as equals, and there would be no more of the idiocy of transliterating English propaganda into a foreign language, because the propaganda would be not English but European.

In the second place, there should be a department of European propaganda research, which would incorporate under a single united control the newspaper analysis of Chatham House, the "monitoring" of the B.B.C., and, above all, the wealth of experience and knowledge to be found among the refugees resident in Britain. At present a huge staff and very large sums of money are scattered among a number of independent and isolated research units which are staffed almost entirely by British nationals, while refugees from every country, with the highest qualifications, are left idle or interned. All this research needs not co-ordination—a fatal word for setting up another committee—but unification under a central directing purpose.

And it also needs humanizing. Every day the B.B.C., for instance, issues a large volume, including a digest of all foreign broadcasts. That is useful if we remember that a digest may omit those turns of phrase and intonation which often reveal the secret of the enemies' propaganda. It should be supplemented by specialized listening groups, staffed by foreign nationals who can feel the significance of the propaganda and register it,

not like a dictaphone, but as members of the nation to which it is addressed. And the same applies to foreign newspapers.

This specialist propaganda research is vital to the strategy of European revolution. It is still assumed that the news which should be sent out to Europe can most of it be found on "the tape" which records the incoming messages of the press agencies. But there is a vast amount of material which is not "news" in the sense that any agency would telegraph it and yet might be made into news of vital importance to the oppressed peoples of Europe. They do not want to hear only details of aerial battles, of submarine warfare, of international politics. They want to be told of the day-to-day events in their countries and to receive explanations of the policy of their Nazi oppressors. News for them means any facts which will help them in their struggle for freedom. And to make such bulletins as they need, a department of propaganda research is required which analyses enemy propaganda and sorts out the information received by the secret service and similar agencies from the conquered countries. Such a research department could enable British propaganda to become, what it should be, the newspaper of the secret army of the illegal fighters against Nazism and Fascism.

The European editor would keenly view the complicated pattern of Europe knowing the unreality which covers it all with the Swastika flag. In the Balkans, he would hope less of the terrorized Governments of Hungary, Rumania, and Yugoslavia and would adopt the technique, which was after all not unsuccessfully

elaborated in the last war, of aiding the oppressed minorities and classes, which are far more genuinely the enemies of Hitlerism than a Government which is afraid of its own impoverished people can ever be. A realistic propaganda staff could do more with Poland and Czechoslovakia than is done at present, because the present authorities in Britain are as frightened of Bolshevism as the Nazis themselves. Moreover, no sooner was such a policy adopted than Stalin, playing for his own hand in a world of capitalist states, would see in Britain, if not a friend whom he could trust, at least a useful force in the struggle to maintain the Soviet Union. We may look round the map to each of the countries conquered and overshadowed and discover the same forces which are potentially British allies. In spite of British folly, there is still wide-spread discontent with the Fascist Government in Italy and that discontent, if it is really desired to overthrow Mussolini, instead of propping him up, as the British have, until he actually declared war upon them, can be fomented. Neither is it too late in Spain, though the Republicans betrayed by France and Britain have now as little love for them as they have for Germany or Italy. They could still be aided and organized, and would recognize British help provided they knew that the British Government was genuinely fighting a war of liberation.

In Germany itself Britain has allowed every opportunity to slip. After a long series of successes, Hitler's hold over the population is greater than it has ever been in the past. It is only recently that British broadcasts and leaflets to the German people have been

based on any kind of realism. The one idea obsessing the mind of the British Government when the war began was that a conservative Germany, perhaps led by Field-Marshal Göring, would overthrow Hitler and make a gentleman's peace. For absurdity this delusion can only be compared with the parallel French obsession that it was possible once again to revive the Austro-Hungarian Empire, under the Habsburgs. The anti-Hitlerian forces are not to be found in discredited monarchists or conservative business-men, but in the down-trodden trade-unionists and factory-workers, who even now, especially in Austria and Czechoslovakia, show their courage by making bombs of sand.

Some of this, you will say, is surely already done. The British do now make such broadcast appeals. That, up to a point, is true. But if this propaganda were co-ordinated with foreign policy, if they organized an international brigade, if they appealed to the world not as a pluto-democracy but as a centre of liberation, where the forces of the future could be organized, subsidized, and given confidence that the might of the Empire was behind them, then indeed the beginnings of the turn of the tide would be seen. Let us recall that most of Europe will be hungry in the coming winter, and that Britain will not win the confidence or friendship of the Belgians or the Dutch or the French by blockading and bombing them as parts of Germany, but that it may well win to its side large numbers in these countries if they can be convinced that it does indeed offer them a world that is better than Hitler's. Let us recall that the apparently high morale of the

German troops is based on hard discipline and insufficient nourishment. It is a morale of nerves, and may well prove brittle. Indeed, one of the most interesting questions for the speculations of a psychologist is the possible effects of a serious reverse or even a prolonged check on the minds of the Nazi troops, who so far know nothing but easy success. An infallible God who proves fallible may quickly fall from this throne.

Another department should organize propaganda to the coloured peoples, who may be an immense force on the British side if they are assured that this is a war of liberation and not a war to rivet the exploitation of foreign capital on their shoulders. Here, once again, is an obvious point at which policy and propaganda cannot be dissociated. At the beginning of this war the Great Congress Party of India, which represents the vast mass of politically conscious Hindus and a large part of the Moslem community also, offered its services on the British side, provided that it was given guarantees that this war meant liberation for India. Tragically and absurdly, this offer was refused. The threatened outbreak of active revolt in India has been restrained because Mr. Gandhi and the other Indian leaders have not wished to make Britain's danger India's opportunity. But today there are ominous signs of increased tension; the leaders of the Left, including Nehru, are in prison; the keener Nationalists may in time refuse to accept the cautious counsels of their leaders. Whether or not the British Empire can once again hold down the incipient revolt, I do not know. It is of secondary importance. For the

primary folly is to reject the vast potential support of an India in active co-operation with Britain's own fight for freedom. An editor-in-chief who surveys the situation would see at once the danger of the Nazi radio propaganda campaign in India and would put into force the excellent program of native propaganda which experts have worked out for India, but which authority has neglected.

Conclusions

These are indications of what might be done in the foreign field if a British Government were really determined to turn this war into a war of liberation. It would only succeed if there were also a campaign of social change at home, without which popular propaganda would have no effect. The most successful home propaganda yet done in this war was the announcement made by Mr. Churchill and by Mr. Attlee, when the new Government was formed, that the state would now be as ruthless in conscripting property as it had already been in conscripting life. Since then not very much has been done to give reality to these fine words. Agricultural wages have been raised; so have old-age pensions, and improvements are being made in factory welfare and workmen's compensation and the "Means Test" for the unemployed. But these are not enough for the workers who know that there are still eight hundred thousand unemployed; who know that the Ministry of Supply is still no more than a name for an inadequate controlling authority giving contracts to private rings of employers, whose excess-profits tax

can be spent in preparation for increased profits after the war. Let us recall that more than seventy per cent of the total population of Britain is made up of families with incomes of less than four pounds a week. This section of the community, black-coated and industrial workers, have not been able to evacuate themselves or their wives to safer areas, though they are often separated from their children; and they work in the most exposed and dangerous zones. Yet the B.B.C. still talks with a middle-class accent. Its approach, matter, and manner are all designed not for the worker but for the inhabitant of suburbia. Ernest Bevin and Herbert Morrison have begun to speak to the British working people, but busy Ministers can do no more than give occasional talks. Working men, and particularly working women, could be most effective broadcasters, but only, let it be added, if, when they talk of the sacrifices involved in this war, their hearers know that the war is really not producing profits for a few and sacrifices for many. If they believe that industry is really being organized for the national and not private benefit, if rationing means equality and not the restriction of the necessities of the poor and a broad choice of alternatives for the well-to-do. Let us be clear about one thing. Exhortation is no longer good propaganda. It is no use telling people to "go to it" if there is nothing to go to; no use talking about sacrifices as long as society remains divided into rich and poor; and no use expecting the mass of workers, who hate Fascism in Germany, but fear it in Britain also, to put their backs into the war unless they can see with their own eyes that their

own position is being improved and that the Government is really working for a free world with equality as its basis.

Dr. Goebbels has announced that the Nazis have come to wipe out all the principles of the French Revolution of 1789. He tells the truth. Instead of liberty, there is to be servitude. Instead of equality, the rule of the German superman. Instead of fraternity and internationalism, a Europe in which the sub-men of the conquered countries slave for the new German Empire. This new concept of Europe cannot be countered by the appeal to nationalism and the rights of property for which the last war was fought. The only effective propaganda will be one which offers a *Weltanschauung* as revolutionary as Hitler's, and which accepts, as Hitler does, the conception of a united Europe. Napoleon once conquered Europe in the name of liberty; by treading on the liberties of other nations and wiping out their feudal Governments, he roused against himself a new aspiration of national liberty, which conquered him. Something of the same sort may occur in Europe today if England can imagine it and will it and work for it.



CHAPTER IV

THE HOME OFFICE AND THE FIFTH COLUMN

What Is the Fifth Column?

IN ORDER to adopt the strategy of revolution two things are needed: first, the co-operation on terms of complete mutual confidence between the British Government and the men and women of the oppressed peoples of Europe who are experienced in the technique of illegal warfare; and secondly, the assurance that Hitler is not permitted to build in Britain a Fifth Column. Obviously these two requirements are closely related. If the British build an organ of European revolution they will have to face the risk that Nazi agents may get inside it and use it for themselves. All illegal movements are in danger of "penetration" by their opponents. It was only after the October Revolution, for instance, that the Russian revolutionists discovered that one, at least, of

the most trusted members of its executive committee had been a Czarist police spy. While the British make every effort to place their own people in key positions in the Nazi movement, we can be sure that the Nazis also are active, trying to get their own men into places of influence in Whitehall, in the secret service, in the police and industry. This, of course, was the practice in the last war, but this time the position is complicated by the novel characteristics of total warfare. Since this is no longer a mere war between the governments and armies of nation states, but a civil war between the men behind the Nazi war machine and the people of Europe, the simple division between the British fighting for Great Britain and the Germans fighting for Germany is no longer complete. Tens of thousands of Germans have been fighting for Germany against Hitler ever since 1933 because they believed that the true interests of the German people demanded the destruction of the Nazi regime. In the same way the British Union of Fascists, for years before the war, was doing active and open propaganda for Hitler's Germany and against the democratic forces in Britain and in the rest of Europe. Some of this propaganda was no doubt sincere. There are Fascists who are convinced that it is to the best interests of Great Britain for Hitler to build his new European order, just as Communists believe that it is in the true interests of the British workers that the U.S.S.R., through the Third International, should extend its influence over Europe and the British Isles. There are, of course, "international spies" prepared to sell the secrets of their country to the highest bidder, but these men

and women, though they may still play a secondary role, are the relics of a previous epoch of war. In a war which is at one and the same time a war between nation states and a war between rival ideologies, the most useful agents to be acquired in the hostile camp are not paid hirelings, but men and women of high sincerity, fanatically convinced that patriotism demands the destruction of their country's government in the cause of their countrymen's liberty. This is the revolutionary élite which each side employs. Hitler can always rely on fanatical Fascists and anti-Bolshevists to form his Fifth Column. As he said to Dr. Rauschning (*The Voice of Destruction*), "We shall find such men, we shall find them in every country. We shall not need to drive them. They will come of their own accord." Equally, the British can rely on the anti-Fascists and anti-Nazis, both those in exile in Britain and those still working in secret in the Third Reich. These men do not work for pay: all they want are facilities to carry on the secret war against Hitlerism which they were already waging at a time when the British Government was pursuing its fatal policy of appeasement.

There is little doubt that if we compare the strength of the active and self-conscious anti-Fascist groups in the Third Reich and its occupied territories with that of the active and self-conscious Fifth Column in Britain, we possess—potentially at least—an overwhelming numerical superiority, and also, we may add, an overwhelming moral superiority. Here, at least, is a weapon of warfare in which, thanks to no foresight on their own part, the British have a predominance infinitely more

striking than that of General Göring's air force. Granted that Hitler's defensive weapons against revolutionary activity, what he calls his *Sicherheitswesen*, under the control of Herr Himmler, are infinitely superior to anything the British possess, it still remains true that the advantage lies with the British in the offensive weapon. The position in this field of war is precisely the opposite of that in the air. In the air the Nazis possess overwhelming superiority in the striking force of their bombers, while Britain's strength lies in the superior skill of its fighters and the vastly superior organization of its A.R.P. services. In the war of revolution and counter-revolution the Nazi defensive services are superior to the British, while the British potential striking force outnumbers theirs literally by thousands to one; and if the British do the job properly, it will increase week by week during the long winter months of stagnation on other fronts.

But the deliberate and fanatical revolutionary is only a small part of the army of revolution. His function is like that of the armoured divisions and the dive bombers. The second line of the revolutionary army is made up of men of a very different quality. They are the potential Fifth Columnists who work for the enemy not from the high-minded conviction that the overthrow of their own Government by revolutionary violence is their highest patriotic duty, but out of fear of the consequences of a prolonged war. These are the men and women who at a moment of crisis, when the issue hangs in the balance, can be cajoled by the active revolutionaries to lead a movement for capitulation. We are

not here concerned with the masses of the people, but with people of high position and rank in the state, who when things are going well are among the most vigorous supporters of the Government—those politicians, civil servants, business-men, newspaper magnates, bishops, and trade-union leaders who have achieved positions of power by consistently backing the winning side. Such men and women are to be found in every country. Their symbol is the Vicar of Bray.

Once again, however, we must avoid over-simplification. In the last war, when the German front collapsed and the Kaiser fled into exile, there were innumerable civil servants and politicians in Germany who found themselves suddenly converted from a conventional worship of Kaiserism to an equally conventional belief in democracy. They swam with the revolutionary tide in 1918, and nearly all of them swam back with the counter-revolutionary tide in 1933. But this is a civil war as well as a national war between Britain and Germany. In consequence certain new ideological factors enter which determine the character of the potential capitulators in each country. People will be more inclined to capitulate inside Germany, for instance, if they have always at the bottom of their hearts despised the Nazis and hated their doctrines of racialism and permanent war. Up and down the Nazi bureaucracy there are men in important positions who have disguised their true beliefs and principles for many years. The majority have practiced this deception so long that in process of time they have been converted to National Socialism without recognizing the process. But there

are still a certain number who will rediscover their principles if it looks as though the National Socialist system is likely to crash and if they can find men to lead them of higher principle and greater courage than themselves. We should not despise them for their half-heartedness. Few human beings have the courage to stake everything on a principle, and most of us will compromise our ideals to some extent for the sake of our social position, our livelihood, and our family. These crypto-democrats should be recognized as potential allies of the very greatest importance.

What is the corresponding type in Britain? Who are the crypto-Fascists that will perform the same function, if Hitler has his way, as the crypto-democrats in Germany if the British win the revolutionary war? On this point we have fortunately a good deal of highly reliable evidence. The French disaster can be turned to positive advantage if we learn from it the character of the crypto-Fascist. We must be careful, however, not to press the analogy too closely, but to take account of the profound difference in social conditions between France and Britain.

The common characteristic of the members of the Pétain Government and its collaborators is that they were all, for very varied reasons, half-hearted in their support of the war. Some of them, headed by M. Laval, whose pacifism is the only consistent trait in a singularly unscrupulous career, were convinced that the destiny of France lay not in collaboration with the British Empire, but in a Latin confederation with Spain and Italy. This confederation would form a bottom end of the

Axis, strong enough to counterbalance the war-lords in Berlin, and would develop a Latin form of authoritarian government more "civilized" than that of the Nazis. This foreign policy was combined with the usual fear of the Communist bogey, and a desire to maintain the position of the small peasant and *rentier* who are the heart and soul of "*la province*." M. Laval and M. Daladier are the political expression of that vast *petite bourgeois* class whose position is threatened by modern industrial and commercial progress. They are reactionaries in the true sense of the word, since they wish to go back to a type of economy incompatible with modern conditions. Thus they become unconsciously defeatist. They hate the present only less than they hate the future; and they realize that the war economy, necessary to achieve victory today, means the destruction of all that they stand for. They did all in their power to sabotage the League of Nations and collective security and to come to an understanding with Germany. But they failed, and for them, as for Mr. Chamberlain, the outbreak of war was the ruin of the only world they could think tolerable. It faced them with an intolerable dilemma. In order to win they must permit the social revolution which a planned war economy demands; in order to prevent that social revolution they must become traitors to their country. Being men of little courage, they did neither but chose the path of compromise. Putting every obstacle in the way of an efficient prosecution of the war, they still offered lip service to the war effort. Then when the French war

effort, not unnaturally, proved unsatisfactory, they held up their hands in despair and talked about the invincibility of the Nazi war machine and the impossibility of democracy proving as efficient as dictatorship. Meanwhile they used the emergency powers of the Government for a bitter attack upon working-class conditions and for the wholesale arrests of Communists, and also of anyone else who dared to expose the inadequacy of the war effort. Finally, having, by their obstructionism, sapped the morale of the people and made military defeat inevitable, they denounced the "war-mongers," engineered the capitulation, destroyed the Third Republic, and set themselves up as the new rulers of an authoritarian France.

The word "defeatism" is often abused, but M. Laval and his friends were precisely defeatists. They could will neither victory nor defeat, and so they saw defeat as inevitable. This mood was not confined to any one party or class, though it was naturally strongest among the politicians representing the *petite bourgeoisie*. Wide sections of the Socialist Party, who had been ardent *Munichois*, had been infected with the same disease, while the Communist rank and file, infuriated by the arrest of their leaders at a time when leading pro-Germans retained positions of influence, became equally defeatist in outlook. The only difference was that the Communists fostered the delusion that if the French Government was defeated they would be able to stage a Communist revolution. Another sort of defeatism was wide-spread among the civil service, which was

only too ready to cover up its own red tape and rigid departmentalism by emphasizing the invincible strength of the Nazi war machine.

To conclude from the French capitulation that a similar situation exists in Britain is, of course, absurd. The weakness of France lay in its backward peasant economy, the hostility between town and country, and the divisions in its labour movement. The main strength of Britain lies in the organization of the industrial workers, whose leaders know perfectly well what their fate would be under the Nazis; and this labor movement holds a powerful position in the Churchill Government. But there are particular classes and groups in which defeatism might easily grow—chief among them, the small shopkeepers, whose position, undermined before the war by modern methods of retail trade, is now nearly desperate. Fortunately, this class is badly organized and has little political leadership, since it falls between the stools of organized labor and organized capital. A second class which needs careful observation are the civil-service routineers, men who have risen to high position in the easy-going times of peace and cannot adapt themselves to the demands of a planned war economy which calls for personal initiative such as they have been taught to suppress. Probably the most dangerous group in Britain is associated with the City of London. These are not the business executives who control the great industrial and commercial enterprises, but the men, far removed from the actual work of production, whose financial operations determine the fate of the profits. For such men and for their Parliamentary

representatives—those hard-faced men whom Mr. Keynes observed after the coupon election of 1918 and who have dominated British politics ever since—the future is bleak indeed. An efficient war economy would dispose of their services, such as they were, altogether, while social justice will increasingly demand a startling reduction in their standard of living. In the hive of war they are the drones. As the war destroys their social and economic privileges, they are likely to become increasingly unenthusiastic. In a tight corner such men might possibly convince themselves, or permit others to convince them, that, rather than permit “Bolshevism” in Britain, they should negotiate with the Nazis and save something at least from the ruins of civilization.

It is among these classes that the leaders of the second line of the Fifth Column should be sought. The surest way of discovering them is to observe them carefully in chance conversation. For it is the odd remark and the occasional judgment that often discloses the real defeatist outlook. Here are some typical odd remarks which are the sure signs of a potential capitulator:

“The best way to increase production and get the working classes disciplined would be to forbid trade unions.”

“Frankly, if it came to the choice, I would rather have Fascism than Communism.” This remark is particularly significant, since there is no conceivable chance of Communism in Britain; what the speaker really means is that he would rather have Fascism than any other drastic social change.

"One has to admit that democracy cannot be so efficient as dictatorship." This is the regular defence, used by the civil-service routineer to excuse his incapacity.

"Even if we do win, we shall have destroyed everything we are fighting for." This is a common comment among Left-wing intellectuals. It really means that, since the political and cultural coteries are unlikely to survive the war, their members have lost interest in the struggle. The intellectual who merely wants room for his talents is only too often to be found after Hitler's revolution in a quiet room in a Fascist Ministry of Culture.

Popular grumblings can always be cured by energetic leadership. It is when the leaders are infected by the disease that precautions must be taken. Conversely, an apathetic or defeatist public opinion is always evidence of inadequate leadership. Hitler understands this fact: "A mass that is apathetic and dull is the greatest threat to unity. Apathy is to the masses a defensive form of rejection. . . . The statesman who fails to take immediate steps against the growing apathy of the masses ought to be impeached" (*The Voice of Destruction*). Hitler does not suggest the impeachment of the masses for apathy or the prosecution of the man in the street for defeatist remarks. He realizes, better perhaps than the British Ministry of Information, that it is the leaders and not the rank and file who must be punished if the man in the street is apathetic and lacks confidence in victory.

The Home Office and the Refugees

Having seen the real character of the potential Fifth Column, we can now examine the policy of the Government departments concerned with Home Security. How has the Home Office dealt with the menace of the Fifth Column? Surprisingly enough, in view of the foregoing analysis, the first concern of the Home Office was not with the individuals and classes in Britain where, on all the evidence, the chief danger lies, but with a small isolated group for which interest and principle alike decree a loyal hatred of National Socialism. Of all groups in the country that of the German and Austrian refugees is one in which the fanaticism of the active Fascists and the defeatism of the passive capitulator are least likely to be found. Men, women, and children who have lost everything through Nazi persecution and who can only expect the concentration camp if Hitler defeats Britain are *prima facie* unlikely to be either ardent Nazis or inclined in a crisis to give active leadership to a movement for capitulation. And yet it is precisely this group that the Home Office, on the command of the War Office, first selected for wholesale internment, while Englishmen of known Fascist sympathies—let alone the crypto-Fascists—were permitted to hold positions of high responsibility. It is worth asking the how and why of this extraordinary situation.

The history of British policy towards the victims of Nazi persecution is an unedifying one. Hitler's racial mania dealt a deadly blow at the strength of the Third

The outbreak of war closed all the immigrant countries to the refugees except the United States. Nearly a hundred thousand people were left stranded in Britain; they could neither work there nor could they, as had been the Government's intention, get out as soon as possible. Thereupon the Government policy changed; 110 one-man tribunals were set up all over the country under lawyers or judges, and empowered to give either A, B, or C Certificates to the refugees. A meant internment; B freedom, but under certain restrictions; C complete freedom.

Through no fault of their own, the men selected to judge the refugees were only too frequently totally unsuited for the job. There were immense variations according to the temperament of the particular judge. But one fairly general rule was observed: the non-political refugee was regarded as more reliable than the political exile. This distinction of refugee and exile is of special importance. Refugees are people who have fled from their country and are seeking to set up a home elsewhere with little hope or intention of returning to their native land; exiles are men and women who have fled from their country in order to prosecute revolutionary warfare against the Third Reich. The vast majority of the exiles belong to the Left-wing political parties and to the trade-union movement, for the simple reason that most of the leaders of the other parties were crypto-Fascists who have come to terms with the Nazis. Far too many of the tribunals, however, regarded the exiles with suspicion simply because they were Socialists or Communists. Some judges were so ignorant that they

held it against an exile that he had been in a concentration camp—as though punishment by the Nazis was an indication of bad character! One poor woman received an especially bad mark because she could not account for four years of her life in Germany. Those four years had been spent in Dachau. Thus the so-called sifting of the refugees into the three categories made confusion worse confounded. Numbers of the toughest anti-Nazi fighters were given A Certificates (as the public suddenly realized when the *Arandora Star* was sunk), while Nazi agents, by claiming to be non-political business-men, may well have been granted the freedom permitted by the C Certificate.

But for the mass of the refugees and exiles conditions were somewhat better during the early months of the war owing to the decision of the Government, on November 27, 1939, to permit refugees to seek employment. By May 1940, some 15,000 were employed. And although in its wisdom the War Office had forbidden the German enemies of Hitler to fight for Britain as they fought for the Spanish Republic, thousands of able-bodied anti-Nazis had joined the Auxiliary Pioneer Corps, and proved in the Flanders disaster that the German democrat, even if he is only armed with a pick and shovel, will fight the Nazi army. Suddenly, on May 11, the Government policy changed. All male refugees between the ages of sixty and sixteen were interned, and by the end of June an order had been issued for the wholesale internment of all Germans and Austrians, whatever their loyalty. Propagandists, scholars, B.B.C. announcers, industrialists, chemists, and a host of

skilled workers were suddenly taken from the work which they had at last been permitted to do, and thrown into ill-prepared and inadequately equipped camps. Similarly all the Italians in the country were rounded up, Fascists and anti-Fascists being herded into the same camps. This peculiarly inhuman practice of putting the supporters and the enemies of the Third Reich into the same prisons had been begun long before, when the A refugees were interned with Nazi prisoners of war. It was to reach its climax when the inmates were indiscriminately huddled aboard the *Arandora Star* and other liners to be transported to the Dominions. The *Arandora Star* went down amid scenes of indescribable confusion, Fascists and anti-Fascists, Nazis and anti-Nazis fighting one another. The War Office, who controlled the internment camps and arranged the transportation, showed its complete ignorance of the issues at stake when Mr. Anthony Eden, in the House of Commons, blandly denied that there were any friendly aliens on board. A few days later he modified this statement, explaining that there were only category A aliens on board. But the War Office refused to publish any complete lists, either of the casualties or of the survivors; probably no one exactly knows who was on board.

The effect of this new policy on Britain's war effort was highly disturbing. At a time when Britain is desperately short of trained nurses, about 700 Czech nurses were dismissed from British hospitals, as well as all alien doctors. Of the six charcoal-making plants—the only modern ones in Britain—started by an Austrian,

three are now idle as the result of internment. On the Treforest Trading Estate, where there were sixteen factories with German or Austrian key men as directors employing 1,252 British workers, 19 of the aliens were interned and 75 ordered to move out of the district. On the Team Valley Trading Estate there were several small works employing 175 British workers and 50 German and Austrian key men. The aliens were all interned. In the B.B.C. there were some 20 Germans assisting in the German propaganda department in the work of translation and announcing. These men and women had all been examined at least twice by the security departments, but they did not escape the persecution. Their radios were taken away, their cars forbidden, and four of them were dismissed on orders from the Home Office, although the grounds were not considered sufficient for internment. These are only a few chance instances of the effects on Britain's war effort of the wholesale internment policy. More important and more tragic was the mental effect on the refugee and the exile. The women and children were left without any means of subsistence when their men were rounded up by the police. Close on 100,000 people who had been the devoted adherents of the British cause, and regarded Britain, despite the meanness of its policy, as an asylum from persecution, suddenly found themselves treated in a way which they had previously associated not with democracy, but with National Socialism. Inside the camps they were permitted no newspapers, at least in the early days, and were not even trusted to listen to the Home News Service of the

B.B.C. Cut off from the outside world, at the time of the Nazis' most resounding victories in France, men whose spirit had been unbroken by the concentration camps of the Nazis became the victims of rumour and panic. In one camp a rumour spread that the Nazis had landed, and four men committed suicide. In other cases the police, detailed to arrest the aliens, arrived to find that their victims had preferred poison to imprisonment.

Perhaps the most brutal act of all was the sudden decision to transport whole batches of the refugees. Sometimes this was done without a word of warning to the family outside the camp, sometimes a brief note was received by an anxious wife stating that her husband wanted some warm underclothes, as he was off somewhere.

It has been suggested that the Government's policy was dictated by an overwhelming demand on the part of the British public resulting from the disclosures of Fifth Column activity in Holland and Belgium. This pitiable excuse does not bear looking into. In the first place, in time of war Government policy on matters of high principle should not be determined by an ill-informed public opinion. In the second place, it is simply not true that public opinion was anti-refugee until the Government's own policy and a press campaign had been employed to stir it up. It is true that the use made by the Nazis of German residents in Holland shocked and frightened British people, but it was the business of the Government and press to point out that these Fifth Columnists were not refugees. In spite of the

actions of its rulers and the headlines of some press lords, the mass of the British people refused to believe in the bogey of the refugee Fifth Column.

For it was a bogey. As I write, no evidence has been produced either by the Home Office or by the War Office to show that a refugee Fifth Column exists in Britain. No doubt there are enemy agents among the refugees; it would be surprising if the Gestapo had failed to exploit this method of introducing its agents into the country. But the real question is whether the *proportion* of active enemy agents and crypto-Fascists among the Austrian and German refugees is larger than the proportion among those with British passports? If it is smaller or roughly the same, then there is no reason of national security for rounding the refugees up, far less for deporting overseas able-bodied men with years of experience of illegal warfare in Germany and Italy.

There has been a hard struggle to reverse the effects of this summer panic. In the middle of July public opinion, appalled by the disclosures about conditions on the *Arandora Star* and in some of the internment camps, began to turn against the Home Office. The popular press took up the criticisms of the few papers and periodicals which had denounced the policy from the start, and a considerable number of back benchers in the House of Commons became restive. In a long and heated debate on the adjournment, nearly all the speeches were critical of the Government, and on Tuesday, the 23rd of July, Sir John Anderson was forced to make a statement to the House. In this statement he admitted that many mistakes had been made, promised

to release from internment certain classes of refugees who could be usefully employed, and announced that a new Advisory Committee would be set up to help the Home Office, which will in future be responsible for the control of the camps and the selection of aliens to be transferred overseas. On the main point of principle, however, he remained adamant; wholesale internment was to remain the policy of the Government, though a White Paper lists eighteen categories of useful aliens who may apply for release.

The minor concessions granted by the Home Secretary were not sufficient either to restore the confidence of the refugees in British democracy or to encourage those that are released from internment to give of their best in the war effort. Sir John Anderson never showed the dimmest recognition of the fact that this war is not only a war between nation states but a European civil war. He apparently regarded the refugees as German nationals and therefore the affair of Herr Hitler and his Gestapo. While such a mentality exists in the Home Office or the War Office, it is totally impossible to consider seriously any plans for organizing illegal warfare in Europe against the Nazis. In that case, as Michael Foot asked in a brilliant article in the *Evening Standard*, "Why not intern General de Gaulle?" The Whitehall routineers had only one reply: that General de Gaulle is a general, whereas most of the illegal anti-Nazi fighters are trade-unionists and Socialists and therefore unreliable. But even the bravest general cannot win a war without an army.

I am not concerned in this book with the humani-

tarian aspect of the Government's refugee policy, but with its influence on Britain's war strategy. We have seen that the British can only win this war by a European revolution, and that in this war they must rely, not on an alliance with European states, but on the co-operation of the European peoples. The Governments that now survive under Hitler's domination in Europe today must oppose Britain. A British victory will mean their final eclipse. A means must be found of co-operating with the oppressed peoples. Britain will not win without their help.

By his persecution of German and Austrian democrats Hitler had himself provided Britain with an organ of revolution. He had sifted the grain from the chaff and kept the chaff inside the Third Reich. Only the fanatical democrat and Socialist had gone into political exile with the Jewish victims of racial persecution. Here, in Britain, we had ready to hand the nucleus of a General Staff of European revolution, men and women who knew by long years of illegal work the sort of propaganda that the workers will respond to, the methods of outmanœuvring the Gestapo, and the contacts necessary to permeate the state machine. It is these men and women who have been jailed and transported by the War Office. Do the Brass Hats in the War Office realize that without the active help and co-operation of these men and women the liberation of Europe, to which Britain is pledged, is impossible?

Some of the Brass Hats do now realize this. Or rather, as a well-informed observer put it, they realize it "on Tuesdays and Thursdays." Some of them understand

it, that is to say, sometimes; by the nature of their class and tradition, they do not easily or steadily act on such occasional periods of insight. But important changes have been made in Britain's treatment of aliens in the last few months, and in November 1940 Mr. Morrison, who succeeded Sir John Anderson as Minister of Home Security, was able to announce that only some 10,000 of the 80,000 "enemy aliens" (a technical word which naturally exasperates friendly refugees) actually remained in internment camps. Changes have been made in the treatment of those who are still interned. Conditions have been humanized; they were never intentionally cruel. They were the result of hasty improvisation in a moment of panic. Efforts, not yet wholly successful, have been made to separate Nazis from refugees in the camps; the aged and the sick and infirm have been released, and in the Isle of Man there is the freedom of movement which seclusion on an island permits. New categories have been made eligible for release, and slowly, all too slowly, men who can show a public and distinguished record of opposition to the Nazis are being released. This category has been extended in November to include, in theory at least, quite undistinguished anti-Nazis; but the formula qualifying for release is difficult to satisfy. It is to be hoped that the tribunals who hear these cases will accept as sufficient evidence of political friendship the fact that a man risked his life in fighting the Fascists in Spain, and pay no attention to the demand that an applicant shall prove that he will never be anything but an anti-Fascist! It is difficult to give evidence of one's future ac-

tions. Those who have worked to right this wrong to the victims of the Nazis are still unsatisfied and will remain so as long as a single anti-Fascist who should be helping in the anti-Nazi fight remains behind barbed wire. But we are glad to admit that after long delays—and there still are shocking delays—many who can co-operate in propaganda or who can serve in the Pioneer Corps—a fair demand in the case of the younger refugees—have been freed. We go on to hope that those about whom too little evidence is forthcoming and who cannot be unconditionally or immediately released will be permitted to work in communities, under supervision if necessary, instead of being reduced to bitterness and misery in a long-drawn and hopeless captivity.

How to Collaborate with the Exiles

It is not difficult to sketch a sane policy for dealing with the refugees and exiles. In the first place, a distinction must be drawn between that small minority of European aliens in Britain who can be of active use in framing and preparing the British strategy of revolution, and the vast majority. We have seen in the chapter on propaganda how futile the attempt has been to run European propaganda without the active assistance of Europeans; it is even clearer that British civil servants and Brass Hats cannot organize revolutionary activity on their own, far less expect the anti-Nazi and anti-Fascist fighters to become paid hirelings of their secret service. No democrat worthy of his salt will put himself body and soul at the disposal of a Government

whose only interest in European revolution is what Britain can get out of it. To develop a revolutionary strategy the British must be willing to work on equal terms with their European colleagues and to give them the confidence which will arouse their confidence in the British. They themselves will welcome the most scrupulous examination of the credentials of every Englishman and of every one of their own nationals engaged in this vital work. But once a man or a woman has passed this test, there must be no distinction of colour, race, or creed. The General Staff and the executives who control this secret weapon on the Continent will be people of all nationalities; and the departments concerned with European propaganda and with European revolution must, as argued in an earlier chapter, be as truly international in spirit as the League Secretariat in its best years. Europe will not make a revolution in order to save the British Empire from defeat; it will collaborate with the British people on equal terms in the job of destroying the Third Reich.

So far we have only dealt with that tiny minority of aliens who are fitted for responsible tasks in revolutionary warfare. The rest of the refugees should be treated as neither more nor less trustworthy than those who possess British passports, though it should always be remembered that they have more to lose by defeat than most Englishmen. For the able-bodied men a European Legion should be formed, and there is no reason why compulsory military service should not be enforced upon British and non-British alike. Those who refuse should be interned; those in reserved occupa-

tions should be retained, just as Englishmen in reserved occupations are retained. And the women and children of combatants should receive the same allowances as British soldiers.

The formation of this European Legion would in itself be a propaganda work of first-class importance. Certain elements among the French and the Czechs might raise the same sort of objections to fighting side by side with Germans as are raised by British reactionaries. Such objections might reasonably be dealt with by internment, since they indicate a crypto-Fascist frame of mind which can have no place in a Legion fighting a war to liberate all the peoples of Europe. There is no evidence that any such racial objections were raised by the men who served in the International Brigade in Spain. And it would be highly desirable if British volunteers were permitted to fight alongside their European comrades in this Legion.

The Legion and the international departments concerned with European revolution would not only be of service in the actual winning of the war. Even more important, they would be the training ground for the future European leadership when the Third Reich has fallen; they are the nucleus of that international army and bureaucracy which will be needed to manage the affairs of a Europe unified not by slavery, but in voluntary co-operation. In past times such Legions have created the myth and the tradition which bound together nation states newly liberated from old empires. Garibaldi's Legion in Italy and the famous Czech Legion are examples of such organization. In this war a

European Legion and European Propaganda Department will create the tradition not of nationalism but of a new free European order.

It may be argued that though such a policy is right in principle it is far too idealistic and revolutionary to be adopted in Britain; we must be content with the present Home Office compromise on the alien problem under which we release and employ a few valuable aliens and leave the rest idle and miserable in internment. The answer to this is simple. The British cannot win this war on their own insular British terms; they can only win it provided men and women of other nations are willing to risk their lives inside the Third Reich. And they will not do that for the sake of a typical English compromise which treats their revolutionary activity merely as a convenient method of saving the British Empire. European revolution entails a revolution in British outlook. The British themselves must recognize the character of this civil war and their own place as Europeans, on a level with the other peoples of Europe.



CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

WHEN we survey the tragic years of armistice between 1918 and 1939, we note that there were a number of organizations and institutions that embodied the idea of a unified Europe. First, there were practical *ad hoc* bodies which dealt internationally with such matters as a common postal service or international railway trains. Secondly, there were the trade-union and labour organizations which attempted to give the organized workers a solidarity and harmony of interests that cut across international frontiers. Thirdly, there was the Third International of revolutionary workers, which relied ultimately on the armed power of the Soviet Union to produce a Union of Soviet Republics for Europe. Fourthly, there was the League of Nations, a loose union of Governments, which idealists hoped would substitute a machinery of peaceful change for

the old anarchy of sovereign states, but which was destroyed by the Allies, who first used it to maintain their own power and then, lacking the courage of their convictions, turned it into an object of ridicule. All these attempts to unite Europe have been smashed by the Nazi movement.

It would be an interesting, but lengthy, task to examine and analyse the causes that brought all these fine aspirations to nothing. But there are certain obvious lessons that stand out. First, let us notice that the Second International produced at least one good result—the habit of co-operation among working-class men and women. It is still true, in spite of Hitler and Mussolini, that a British sailor or British co-operator talks to a Norwegian sailor or Italian co-operator in a common language which transcends national boundaries. Secondly, the international solidarity of the Communist Parties survives because there are men who still have faith in it and cherish the belief that Russia may use her power to create a Soviet Europe when Nazi Germany is swept away. Thirdly, the League idea survives, though its institutions have perished. It set an example which in one respect at least is highly relevant to our thesis.

Anyone who visited Geneva while international politics were still centred in the League would agree that the Secretariat set up after the war was a remarkable and novel body. It became, astonishingly, an international staff with an international purpose. Until Hitler revived the most blatant nationalism in Europe, it was true to say that the British, the French, the Germans,

the Spaniards, and even the Italians of the Secretariat became public civil servants who had sunk their national allegiances in a greater loyalty to the coming European order. They had at their disposal the knowledge that was necessary, and they handled it with an ability and with a disinterested enthusiasm that were beyond praise. They failed because the Governments which held the ultimate power did not share their international outlook; the power that was represented at Geneva was never put behind the institutions that were set up.

Today we in Britain still have on our side the vast power of the British Commonwealth, and we have within this island the nucleus of Europeans that we need for our task of organizing a new social order. If we do not keep them in internment camps, we have here men and women who understand the weaknesses, as well as the strength, of Fascist Italy, and who have struggled to organize revolution in Italy ever since the March on Rome; we have scores of workers who have risked torture and death through years of underground struggle in Nazi Germany; we have Spaniards who fought for liberty throughout Franco's Civil War; we have Scandinavians, Dutchmen, Czechs, Poles, and Frenchmen who represent the peoples who have not yielded to Hitler. Here, if we would use it, is the personnel who would unite the international outlook of the League of Nations with the revolutionary enthusiasm of the Third International, and who can be effective if they have behind them the armed force of the British Empire. I shall make no attempt at this juncture

to give precision to the picture of the future Europe that is implicit in this book. That it involves national liberation but not a return to national sovereignty; that it involves centralized economic institutions combined with personal liberty—so much is obvious. But I do not know whether it means one federation or more. We shall find out as we go. Once we achieve a revolutionary policy for Europe, build a European Legion, achieve the organization for propaganda and the will for victory, we shall find the blueprint of the new Europe emerging as we conquer.

In this book I have shown that the Government of England is not at present so organized that it could make use of this opportunity. I have shown that the Foreign Office would prove a serious obstacle to the conduct of revolutionary strategy; that the Ministry of Information, as at present organized, cannot conduct the propaganda necessary to promote a European revolution; and that the treatment of the refugee problem by the Home Security Department is in direct contradiction to the strategy of a war of liberation. I have suggested ways in which these departments of state should be reorganized and adapted to this policy by which alone the war can be won. But it is obvious that the obstacles to the adoption of this policy are not purely departmental. To lay the blame on certain ministers and officials is to disregard the main obstacle in the way of victory—the social structure of England and the political outlook of British conservatives of more than one political party.

That obstacle we can see more clearly if we compare

the task of organizing European revolution with that of organizing the war economy at home. Here, too, in the days of the Chamberlain Government, the critics were able to find some easy targets for their attack. Several obviously undesirable and incompetent Ministers have been removed. Now that they have been replaced by men of the quality of Ernest Bevin and Herbert Morrison we are beginning to see the real dimensions of the problems of a planned war economy. No individuals, however great their talents and energies, can from their positions as departmental chiefs produce order out of chaos or transform private capitalism into an economy planned for maximum production. That is a task which demands a planning authority above the level of the departments, and a revolutionary change of policy by the Cabinet itself. It demands a Government whole-heartedly determined to permit no private interest, whatever its dignity or influence, to stand in the way of the war effort, and a Parliament prepared to support the Government in that determination. Above all, it demands a complete change of outlook upon the conduct of the war among both the rulers and the governed.

Everyone realizes the importance of the British armaments program and of the kindred problems of assuring an equitable distribution of the diminished goods and services as the blockade tightens up this winter. We all know that, while we beleaguer Europe, the Nazis are beleaguering us. We shall not get through unless every private interest and privilege is subordinated to the common good. And yet, where all

are agreed, the Government has to feel its way with the utmost caution towards those drastic changes in the economic and social system which alone can give us the British victory. And when impatient critics urge that the pace should be quickened, they always meet the same reply: "This is not a Labour Government, relying on a Labour majority: it is a Coalition Government in a House of Commons predominantly Tory. We cannot go as fast as we should like, or we might lose the confidence of the House." Great indeed is the power of the Conservative Chief Whip, who can dictate during war the pace of the reforms necessary for the nation's survival.

He can do this not only because he is the power who shepherds the Tories into the lobby, but because he and his flock represent a small but influential minority of our fellow citizens outside the House of Commons, the great men of finance and industry. It is these men, responsible to no one for the influence they yield, who must be placated; before the Government can act, their views must be sought and their interests considered.

I am not concerned with the rights and wrongs of this situation. I merely record it as a fact with which anyone anxious to mobilize Britain's industry for national defence has got to reckon, most of all a Government based upon a coalition between a great Tory majority and small Labour and Liberal minorities. The vast majority may clamour for this or that reform, the experts may agree that it is necessary; it will not be carried out unless either the handful of people who matter can be induced to agree, or the Government is prepared to

challenge them to a show-down and risk a defeat in the lobbies.

If this is the position in a matter which we all agree to be urgent, what of an issue like the strategy of war, upon which the public is hardly informed? What likelihood is there of the revolutionary strategy I propose being adopted?

There are many professional pessimists, hardened by years of disappointment and defeat, who will reply "none at all" and leave it at that. I understand this pessimism, but believe, in spite of much discouragement, that there is ground for hope. We in Britain have a longer tradition of parliamentary government and peaceful change than any other country in the world. Time after time, after furious opposition, we have seen reforms carried through which in any other country would have been impossible without violent revolution. The die-hards have blustered and threatened terrible things, but when they have been faced by a Government which knew its own mind and had the people behind it, they have always climbed down at the very last minute. And, be it noted, they have climbed down, not because they were threatened with imprisonment or scared of violence, but because, unlike the die-hards of other countries, when they knew in their hearts that they had been defeated in the argument, they felt that, for the sake of the nation, they must give way.

Today we Britons have reached another of these recurrent crises in our national life. I cannot prophesy what the outcome will be, but it would be futile to conceal that the proposal to adopt the strategy of European

revolution, with all that it implies, would, if it was made even tentatively by the Government, provoke a tremendous struggle. Arrayed against it would be not only those financial interests who would see in a revolutionary foreign policy the surrender of all those imperial interests which depend upon the appeasement of dictator powers, whether in the Far East or nearer home, but also many sincere and patriotic service officers and civil servants who helped to win the last war and still hope to win it all over again. All these gentlemen—and their wives—will be induced to say: "Your proposals are rank Bolshevism; no true Briton can dream of considering them."

And yet I do not despair. At this moment the British are faced by an unusually sharp dilemma. Either they prosecute this war according to the rules of 1918, or they accept, not merely for this or that department but as the central principle of their whole strategy, the idea of European revolution. In the former case, after a couple of years of fruitless war, after appalling privations and possibly one or two costly campaigns, they would find themselves bogged. National unity would have disappeared; social conflict would be sharpened. On the Left a growing demand for violent revolution would meet with an answering violence from the Government; on the Right there would appear an influential but inconspicuous peace party which would whisper that the war must stop if Bolshevism is to be avoided. In the middle would be the great mass of decent, patriotic English men and women, anxious to keep the Nazis out, scared of violent revolution, disillusioned

by the failure of their leaders to defeat Hitler. That is the moment Hitler dreams of. He would not fail to act if it arrived. And it will arrive if Britain tries to win by the rules of 1918.

But there remains the second alternative. I believe that it is possible for this Government, or another Government, to carry out both the planning of war economy at home and a revolutionary strategy abroad. It will be able to do so because defeat is the only alternative to doing so; and, until I see it happen, I refuse to believe that a sufficient body of Pétains in Britain are prepared to force us to capitulate for fear of their own common people. It is because Hitler also is uncertain whether they will play the part he has allotted to them that he fears Britain more than any country in the world.

But if the Government is to adopt this new strategy and the entire change of outlook which it implies, it needs the support of a vigorous, informed, and impatient public opinion—not a silent column, but an army of soldiers and civilians actively demanding the declaration of a people's war, uncompromising and ungentlemanly, upon the Third Reich. The British cannot blame the Government for hesitation when they hesitate themselves. If they are to wage a revolutionary war in Europe, they must have a peaceful revolution at home, such as British democracy has always achieved in the moments of gravest peril.

For such a revolution there is need above all for one thing—a picture of the new order which the British will build in their own country and will help the peoples of Europe to build in theirs. What is the new Eu-

ropean order which shall issue out of this revolutionary war, as Hitler's order is emerging out of his seven years of conquest? That is the last question I must raise in this book. It is the hardest of all to face, and I cannot hope to do more than sketch a reply.

First of all, it is easy to say some of the things it will not be. It will not be a return to the anarchy of sovereign states, barring out one another's goods and arming against one another in futile conflict. Hitler has unified Europe in slavery to the Third Reich; it will not find liberation in the anarchy of nation states. Secondly, it will not be a return to the senseless confusion of state and private enterprise or to the economy of artificial scarcity which marked the epoch between the last war and this. The eggs of private capitalism have been scrambled to make the omelet of war economy, and no one will be able to unscramble them even if he was crazy enough to want to.

The only choice for Europe is between the monopoly feudalism of the Nazis, a war machine imposed by force on peoples reduced to serfdom, and a Europe whose economic life is planned not to maintain the power of the war-lords and the privileges of their bureaucracy, but to raise the standard of living of the peoples within its frontiers, to iron out their inequalities, and to provide them with security of employment. The Nazis have solved the unemployment problem by making warfare an eternal part of their system. In their paradise we shall escape from unemployment into slavery to the war machine. We must offer a solution which enables us all to work not for war or for profits but in order

to liberate the world from the enemies of poverty and disease. We have been slaves of the gold standard; let us become free men and set up a work standard in its place. Let us be clear that we cannot achieve this as long as we maintain the structure of imperialism. As long as capital is poured into backward areas only when the investment produces profit, the older industrial countries will remain precariously balanced as *rentiers*, living on the sweated labour of native peoples. In India we have begun with all the old prejudices and mistakes. They can be overcome and remedied. Even if the political problem of India is solved, the basic problem of Indian poverty will continue to cry for solution. There is only one sane solution, only one sane way of dealing with the less developed parts of the world. Those who have the power and the money must cease to be owners of these vast territories. They must become the common property of civilization. The capital that they need should be used to develop their resources for the world's benefit and not least for the benefit of the workers in these areas. We are not on the road to clearing up the world's economic mess until we have raised the standard of living of the primary producer to the level already achieved by the industrial worker.

So Britain's message to Europe should be this: Hitler has been destined by history to be the whirlwind which has swept away an old and corrupt order. His ruthless conquests have at least done one good thing—they have exposed the defeatists and the capitulators in the ranks of democracy and forced us to discard outworn institutions and effete privileges. To fight him, the British

have had to pull themselves together, to admit the error of their ways and to begin to scrap their present social inequalities. Since they could only hope to defend them by capitulating to Hitler, they are discarding them and thereby fitting themselves to become what they once were, leaders in the cause of freedom. The British do not ask you to accept their leadership because they are a rich, imperial people. On the contrary, they invite you to join in their war against tyranny because they are now going to sacrifice those riches in that cause of freedom which we all have in common. You ask us what we have to offer you when the battle is done? We reply: "Freedom and work—on equal terms for all. Freedom to think, to practise our own religion, or irreligion, to study, to form trade unions in defence of our working rights, but not freedom to exploit others, to bully them, or to obtain privileges which injure our neighbours. Work, to repair the ravages of war and revolution, to build the thousands of miles of roads and railways which commerce needs, the millions of houses for those who have no homes, the hospitals and schools and universities for the millions who cannot learn. There will be no lack of work if we look not to the individual profit but to the need of all."

This is what we offer you, we shall say. It will not be an easy life for any individual or any class. We shall all be poor compared to the comfortable minority in pre-war days, and we shall probably make many mistakes in our social planning which will bring us hardship and want. But in the planned freedom of the New Europe we shall all be able to express our criticisms and sug-

gestions, though we may not have parliaments and political parties on the old lines. About such things we do not give you any precise programs or proposals because we must work them out together while we fight this war. We give you something we believe is more valuable—the proof positive, in our present manner of living and in our present policy, that our aim now is not the privileges of our island and of its Empire, but the cause of freedom for which we now are fighting and which we can achieve if you join us in the battle. And as an earnest of our sincerity we make you this proposal—that any people which rises up and joins us in this revolutionary struggle shall be thereby joined, if it so wishes, in an indissoluble Union with Great Britain, the bridgehead of the new Europe.

Is this appeal to the peoples of Europe a vain Utopian dream? Would it rouse no sympathy there or in the two great neutrals, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.? In 1920 ~~Adolf~~ Hitler dreamed his vile dream of the Third Reich—and he brought it to pass. To rouse his victims from their hopelessness and ourselves from our apathy, we must, like him, aspire to the impossible—and make it come true.

A NOTE ON THE TYPE

This book is set in Caledonia, a new Linotype face designed by W. A. Dwiggins. Caledonia belongs to the family of printing types called "modern face" by printers—a term used to mark the change in style of type-letters that occurred about 1800. Caledonia is in the general neighborhood of Scotch Modern in design, but is more freely drawn than that letter

The book was composed, printed, and bound by H. Wolff, New York. The paper was made by S. D. Warren Company, Boston.



UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY



141 690

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

